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I. INTRODUCTION
The national health care system' underwent dramatic cost in-
creases during the 1970's2 and 80's.3 In spite of vigorous efforts to
1. "The American health [care] system is a hybrid - partly government-managed, partly private,
partly in-between; partly a model of excellence, and partly a disgrace." BuDoaT OF TIH UNrED STATES
GovmmNT FiscAL YEAR 1992, H.R. Doc. No. 3, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1991).
2. The following Table compares national health care expenditure and gross national product for
the period 1970-79:
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF GROWTH RATES OF GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT AND NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 1970-79
GNP NHE NHE
Amount Rate of Amount Rate of as %
Year (billions) growth (billions) growth of GNP
1970 $1,015.5 5.3 S 75.0 14.3 7.4
1971 1,102.7 8.6 83.5 11.3 7.6
1972 1,212.8 10.0 94.0 12.6 7.8
1973 1,359.3 12.1 103.4 10.0 7.6
1974 1,472.8 8.3 116.1 12.3 7.9
1975 1,598.4 8.5 132.7 14.3 8.3
1976 1,782.8 11.5 150.8 13.6 8.5
1977 1,990.5 11.7 169.9 12.7 8.5
1978 2,249.7 13.0 189.7 11.7 8.4
1979 2,508.2 11.5 214.7 13.2 8.6
HEALTH INSURANCE AssoC. OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA, 49 (1989) [hereinafter
SOURcEBOOK].
For a general discussion on cost increases, see Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping
With Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSRO, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 6, 9-15 (1975);
Michael G. Michaelson, Comment, Reagan Administration Health Legislation: The Emergence of a Hidden
Agenda, 20 HAtv. J. oN LEGms. 575, 576-583 (1983).
3. "Although the American health [care] system leads the world in research and in many specialized
areas, its general performance is not yet satisfactory. Its costs continue to grow faster than both inflation
and the economy. Total national expenditures on health now claim 13.5 percent of GNP. Federal health
2
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reduce health care costs by federal4 and state governments, we have
spending is over 15 percent of the budget." BuDGEr OF Tim UNrrED STATEs GovE~mENT FISCAL YEAR
1992, H.R. Doc. No. 3, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991). The following Table compares national health
care expenditure and gross national product for the period 1980-87:
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF GROWTH RATES OF GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT AND NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 1980-87
GNP NHE NHE
Amount Rate of Amount Rate of as %70
Year (billions) growth (billions) growth of GNP
1980 $2,732.0 8.9 $248.1 15.6 9.1
1981 3,052.6 11.7 287.0 15.7 9.4
1982 3,166.0 3.7 323.6 12.8 10.2
1983 3,405.7 7.6 357.2 10.4 10.5
1984 3,772.2 10.7 388.5 8.8 10.3
1985 4,014.9 6.4 419.0 7.9 10.4
1986 4,240.3 5.6 455.7 8.7 10.7
1987 4,526.7 6.7 500.3 9.8 11.1
SoURCE BOOK, supra note 2 at 49.
For a general discussion on cost increases, see Andreas G: Schneider, Legal and Political Pressures
on Health Care Cost Containment, 36 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 693 (1985); Carl J. Schramm, A State-Based
Approach to Hospital-Cost Containment, 18 HARv. J. ON LEols. 603 (1981); David Parkin et al., Aggregate
Health Care Expenditures and National Income, 6 J. HFALTH EcoN. 109 (1987).
4. The following Table presents national health expenditure data for the federal government during
the period 1970-85:
TABLE 3
FEDERAL SPENDING AS PERCENTAGE OF
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES
Federal Spending Percentage

















Kenneth R. Wing, American Health Policy In The 1980's, 36 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 608, 651 (1985).
For examples of federal statutes aimed at controlling the cost of health care expenditure, see Health
Maintenance Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 242b (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 255 (1988).
It will be noted that medical malpractice reform measures were included in the federal budget proposal
3
Cleckley and Hariharan: A Free Market Analysis of the Effects of Medical Malpractice Dama
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
entered the 90's with a great percentage of the population being
unable to afford health care services. 6 Along the road to the present
for fiscal year 1992. "To help keep health care costs down the Bush Administration would offer incentives
to the states to enact a series of reforms .... States would have until 1995 to adopt the reform package.
Hospitals in states that did not enact tort law changes would face the loss of about $800 million in federal
Medicare funds in 1995." Insurance Information Institute, Medical Malpractice, Sept., 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file. See infra note 218, for the complete text of the proposal.
For a general discussion of federal legislation, see Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities
and Services By Certificate of Need, 59 VA. L. Ray. 1143 (1973); Milton I. Roemer, The Expanding Scope
of Governmental Regulation of Health Care Delivery, 6 U. TOL. L. Rav. 591 (1974); Rand E. Rosenblatt,
Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243 (1978); Kenneth
R. Wing & Andrew M. Silton, Constitutional Authority for Extending Federal Control Over the Delivery
of Health Care, 57 N.C. L. REV. 1423 (1979); Ira 0. Greenberg & Michael L. Rodburg, Note, The Role
of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HAiv. L. REv. 887 (1971).
5. The following Table presents national health expenditure data for state and local governments
during the period 1970-85:
TABLE 4
STATE AND LOCAL SPENDING AS PERCENTAGE
OF NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES
State and Local Percentage

















Wing, supra note 4 at 651.
For state statutes regulating health care costs, see MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A §§ 31-39 (Law Co-op.
1988 & Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-2(e), 26:2H-18 (West 1987); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 442.400,
442.450 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 27-19-6, 27-19-7 (1989).
For a general discussion of state legislation, see Crozier, State Rate-Setting: A Status Report, I HEALTH
An'. 74 (1982); Alfanso Esposito et al., Abstracts of State Legislated Hospital Cost-Containment Programs,
HEALTH CARE FN. REv., Dec. 1982, at 129; Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care:
The Vulnerable Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REo. 179 (1988); Lawrence S. Lewin et al., State Health Cost
Regulation: Structure and Administration, 6 U. Tot. L. RE,. 647 (1974); Carl J. Schramm, State Hospital
Cost Containment: An Analysis of Legislative Initiatives, 19 IND. L. REy. 919 (1986); Frank A. Sloan,
Rate Regulation as a Strategy for Hospital Cost Control: Evidence from the Last Decade, 61 MutBANK
MEm. FtumN Q. 195 (1983).
6. It was estimated that the uninsured population in the U.S. increased from 28.0 million in 1979
[Vol. 94
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crisis in health care costs, 7 some observers, notably health care
providers8 and insurance underwriters, 9 blamed skyrocketing costs
on the civil judicial system.10 Tort reformers, as these observers were
to 36.8 million in 1986. Factors blamed for this large at-risk population include, "erosion of the Medicaid
program's coverage of the poor; demographic shifts ... and finally, increased health care insurance costs
which have outpaced the growth in incomes." SouRCE BooK, supra note 2 at 11 (1989). See generally
Randall R. Bovbjerg & William G. Kopt, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent: Public and Private
Options, 19 IND. L. REv. 857 (1986); Karen Davis & Diane Rowland, Uninsured and Underserved: Inequities
in Health Care in the United States, 61 MNfBANc Mat. FuND Q. 149 (1983); Pamela J. Farley, Who Are
the Underinsured?, 63 Mu.mANK Mms. FuND Q. 476 (1985); Andreas G. Schneider & Joanne B. Stem,
Health Maintenance Organizations and the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 90 (1975);
Keith Wrenn, No Insurance, No Admission, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 373 (1985).
7. The following Table reports personal consumption expenditure for health care services for the
period 1970-87:
TABLE 5
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES
Hospital Physician Medicine/
Services Services Appliances
Year (billions) (billions) (billions)
1970 $ 19.7 $14.0 $10.0
1971 23.2 15.3 10.5
1972 25.9 16.6 11.5
1973 28.8 18.4 12.5
1974 33.7 20.3 13.6
1975 40.1 23.5 14.9
1976 46.6 25.8 16.3
1977 53.3 29.6 17.4
1978 61.0 32.3 19.2
1979 70.0 36.3 21.6
1980 82.0 42.0 23.5
1981 96.8 49.0 25.8
1982 110.3 54.4 27.6
1983 119.6 61.1 30.3
1984 130.6 67.1 33.0
1985 140.2 73.5 36.0
1986 152.1 80.6 39.2
1987 167.4 93.9 42.9
SouRcE BOOK, supra note 2 at 57.
For a discussion of health care costs to consumers see, Robert J. Blendon & Drew E. Altman, Public
Attitudes About Health Care Costs, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 613 (1984) (where it was reported that 53%
of Americans favor more spending for health care); Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit
the Hospital Industry, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1416 (1980) (arguing that imperfect knowledge by consumers
allows nonprofit hospitals to exploit health care costs); Gosfield, Consumer Accountability in PSROs, 6
U. TOL. L. Ray. 764 (1974) (where it is argued that consumers should be allowed to have an input in
cost and quality control decisions in government health care initiatives).
8. Health care provider refers to physicians and hospitals.
9. Unless otherwise indicated, the terms "insurance underwriters," "insurers," and "insurance in-
dustry" will be used interchangeably to refer to medical malpractice insurance carriers.
10. Among the many factors that make up health care expenditures is that of premium costs for
medical malpractice insurance. Health care providers and insurers have argued that continued escalation
1991]
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labeled," rapidly set out upon a self-imposed mission 2 of decreasing
health care costs 3 by dismantling, state-by-state, medical malpractice
tort laws.' 4
This article is primarily concerned with the analysis of one of
the numerous measures of reform 5  put forth by tort reformers: 6
in medical malpractice premium costs is the result of unfavorable tort laws. For a general discussion, see
Patricia M. Danzon, Liability and Liability Insurance for Medical Malpractice, 4 J. HEALrT EcoN. 309
(1985); Jeffrey O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising From Medical Treatment: A Proposal
for Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21 (1975); Susan S. Septimus, Note, The Concept of Continuous
Tort as Applied to Medical Malpractice: Sleeping Beauty for Plaintiff, Slumbering Beast for Defendant,
22 TORT INS. L.J. 71 (1986); S. Y. Tan, Note, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Will No-Fault Cure the
Disease, 9 U. HAw. L. REv. 241 (1987).
11. The terms "reformers" and "tort reformers" refer exclusively to health care providers and in-
surers, unless otherwise indicated. For a general discussion of tort reform in other areas, see Sylvia M.
Demarest & David E. Jones, Exemplary Damages as an Instrument of Social Policy: Is Tort Reform in
the Public Interest?, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797 (1987); Dominick Vetri, The Integration of Tort Law Reforms
and Liability Insurance Ratemaking in the New Age, 66 OR. L. REv. 277 (1987).
12. Regarding this mission, one commentator put it succinctly: "A drastic basic reform in the entire
mechanism of malpractice litigation is an imperative necessity.... As a united professional group, physicians
and surgeons can withstand any assault upon them via liability threats or actions." Bernard J. Ficarra,
Professional Liability v. Doctors of Medicine, 1975 LEGAL MED. ANN. 117, 148 (1975).
13. For a discussion of specific measures aimed at reducing the cost of health care, see Keith A.
Rosten & James S. Cline, The Effect of Policy Language on the Containment of Health Care Cost, 21
TORT INS. L.J. 120 n.1 (1985) (where it was suggested that the following factors contributed to the escalation
of health care costs: "federal funding in 1946 of hospital construction, which led to an oversupply and
therefore a tendency to over-utilize hospitals; an increase in the number of physicians available to provide
medical services ... advanced and much more expensive technology and equipment; increased longevity;
the creation of government and private programs to pay for medical expenses, such as Medicare and
Medicaid and group insurance; and a general lack of competition in the health care industry, coupled with
little incentive on the part of the consumer to reduce costs."). See also Richard J. Frey, Coalitions on
Health Care Cost, 3 HEALTH MA=xX 38, (Spring 1985); Miles Zaremaski & Joan Rehm, Cost Containment
(DRGs): A New Source for Litigation, 3 HEALTH MATRmIX 24, (Summer 1985).
14. See, e.g., Robert G. Byrd, The North Carolina Medical Malpractice Statute, 62 N.C. L. Rav.
711 (1984); Scott I. Anderson, Comment, Contribution Among Tortfeasors in Washington: The 1981 Tort
Reform Act, 57 WASH. L. REv. 479 (1982); Betsy A. Rosen, Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform
Act: The New York State Legislature Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis With a Prescription for
Comprehensive Reform, 52 BROOK. L. REv. 135 (1986).
15. For discussions of other tort reform measures, see Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory Damage Caps
are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposal for Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L. REv. 763
(1989); Victore Schwartz, Tort Law Reform: Strict Liability and the Collateral Source Rule Do Not Mix,
39 VAND. L. REv. 569 (1986); Jennifer Andrews, Note, Questions Surrounding the Texas Medical Mal-
practice Statute of Limitations, 38 BAYLOR L. Rev. 751 (1986); Richard Boyle, Note, Medical Malpractice
Screening Panels: A Judicial Evaluation of Their Practical Effect, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 939 (1981); Nancy
L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Lint-
itations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 ColREU. L. REv. 628 (1988).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 26-104. See also Jerry S. Phillips, Tort Reform and Insurance
Crisis in the Second Half of 1986, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 277 (1986).
[Vol. 94
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damage cap statutes17 for medical malpractice verdict awards. 8 Our
approach to this issue will be that of an economic or free market
analysis. 19 The application of free market analysis to legal issues is
not novel.20 Free market analysis has become an effective and ef-
ficient tool for investigating legal questions. 2
1
The issue of medical malpractice damage caps22 provides a good
example of a legal question that can be effectively analyzed from
a free market perspective. 23 It was because of the effectiveness of
a
17. Damage cap statutes impose a limitation on the amount of verdict awards in medical malpractice
actions. Statutes differ on the dollar amount of verdict award limitations, as well as on the imposition of
caps, i.e., nonecononic damage cap and/or economic damage cap. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
102.5(3)(a) (1989) ($500,000 noneconomic cap); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407 (Supp. 1989) ($1,000,000 ec-
onomic and noneconomic cap); MAss. GN. L. ch. 231 § 60-H (Supp. 1991) ($500,000 noneconomic cap);
Mo. Am. STAT. § 538.210 (Vernon 1988) ($350,000 noneconomic cap); S.D. CODED LAws ANN. § 21-
3-11 (1987) ($I,000,000 economic and noneconomic cap); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1987) ($250,000
noneconomic cap); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1990) ($1,000,000 noneconomic cap); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.55 (Supp. 1990) ($1,000,000 noneconomic cap).
18. For a general discussion of judicial decisions on damage caps, see Stephen J. Schanz, Michigan
Medical Malpractice Reform: A Constitutional Analysis of Statutory Limitations on Noneconomic Damages,
4 CooiEY L. REV. 457 (1987); Janai M. Powell, Note, Challenging the Constitutionality of Noneconomic
Damage Caps: Boyd v. Bulala and the Right to a Trial By Jury, 24 Wniarmra L. REv. 821 (1988); Paul
B. Weiss, Comment, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment, 38 CATH.
U. L. REv. 737 (1989). See also, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, appeal dismissed, 478
U.S. 892 (1985); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
19. See generally RicEuD A. PosNm, EcoNomc ANALYsIS OF LAW (1986). The terms "economic
analysis" and "free market analysis" will be used interchangeably throughout this article. The terms are
to be understood as referring to "a pure system, one in which all economic activity proceeds through
laissez-faire markets." IsRAn. M. KnmzR, DLscovm.Y, CAPr , AND DisTrmuTwv JusTIcE 4 (1989).
20. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEG. STUD.
289 (1983); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLuM. L. REv. 1600 (1982); Joseph T. Janczyk, An Economic
Analysis of the Land Title Systems for Transferring Real Property, 6 J. LEo. STUD. 213 (1977); William
Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. LAw & EcON. 61 (1971); Patrick Munch, An Economic
Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. EcoN. 473 (1976); Richard A. Posner & Michael W. McConnell,
An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1989); Elizabeth Warren,
Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. PriT. L.
REv. 515 (1981).
21. As one commentator noted, "Statutory or constitutional as distinct from common law fields
... are permeated by economic concerns and illuminated by economic analysis." Postim, supra note 20
at 21.
22. For further discussion, see Ronald E. Wagner & Jesse M. Reiter, Damage Caps in Medical
Malpractice: Standards of Constitutional Review, 1987 Dmr. C.L. REv. 1005 (1987); June C. Arancibia,
Note, Statutory Caps on Damage Awards in Medical Malpractice Cases, 13 OKLA. Cry U.L. REV. 135
(1988).
23. For economic analysis in other areas of medical malpractice tort reform, see Patricia M. Danzon,
An Economic Analysis of the Medical Malpractice System, 1 BayAv. ScI. & L. 39 (1983); Richard A.
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this tool that we were ultimately led to the question: "Can we live
with inefficient doctors? "24
We will reserve resolution of this question until the last part
of this article. Part II of the article provides an overview of the
medical malpractice tort reform movement. Part III discusses med-
ical malpractice tort reform in West Virginia. Part IV examines
case law construing medical malpractice damage cap statutes. An
economic analysis of damage caps is offered in Part V.
Part VI is a necessary and logical conclusion to the article flow-
ing from the economic analysis that precedes it. As this article will
point out, damage caps can, in fact, provide a minimal reduction
in the cost of medical malpractice insurance. However, an un-
conscionable price is paid by the American public as a direct result
of the imposition of a cap on medical malpractice awards. It is
of primary importance that lawmakers rethink the question of
damage caps. The health and the very lives of the American public
hang precariously in the balance because of current thinking on
this matter.
In spite of threats to state health care programs by the Bush
Administration (Epilogue infra) regarding the enactment of dam-
age cap statutes in every state by 1995, we cannot sacrifice human
lives so that a handful of incompetent doctors can afford to buy
expensive cars; surely, human beings are worth more than the
trinkets they manufacture. State lawmakers must resist the pressure
by the Bush Administration to force enactment of damage caps
where they do not exist. Further, in those states where they do
exist, this article fervently urges their repeal.
Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice: The Virginia Obstetrical No-Fault
Statute, 74 VA. L. Rzv. 1451 (1988); Barry R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tight-
ening the Screws, 36 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 985 (1985); M. W. Reder, An Economic Analysis of Medical
Malpractice, 5 J. LEGAL Sa-TrD. 267 (1976); William D. Schwartz & Neil K. Komesar, Doctors, Damages
and Deterrence: An Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1282 (1978).
24. For a detailed treatment of medical malpractice cases, see ANGELA M. HOLDER, MEDICAL MAL-
PRcaCE LAw (1975); CHARLEs KRAmsa, Tim NEFGLiGENT DOCTOR (1968).
[Vol. 94
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II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT REFORM2
A. Impetus for Tort Reform
The 1970's have been characterized as a decade embroiled in
a medical malpractice insurance availability crisis. 26 This was a
period in which the demand for medical malpractice insurance
greatly exceeded the supply of insurers. 27 On the other hand, the
25. Several matters should be kept in mind in considering our discussion of medical malpractice tort
reform. First, "[m]edical malpractice denotes the basis for a civil action brought by a patient against a
physician for injuries resulting from negligence." George J. Annas, et al., Medical Malpractice Litigation
Under National Health Insurance: Essential or Expendable, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1335. Second, tort reform in
this area took place initially in the middle 1970's. A resurgence of reform efforts took place in the middle
1980's. Third, states did not react uniformly in responding to demands for reform, i.e., no two medical
malpractice reform statutes are the same in scope. Finally, we are concerned here with the primary argument
used by tort reformers. That is, the argument that reformation of tort laws would significantly impact on
health care costs. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis,
36 MD. L. REv. 489 (1977); Robert M. Ackerman, Medical Malpractice: A Time for More Talk and Less
Rhetoric, 37 MERCER L. REv. 725 (1986); Karen S. Edwards, The Malpractice Crisis: A National Perspective,
82 Oino ST. MED. J. 641 (1986); Allen Redlich, Ending the Never-Ending Medical Malpractice Crisis, 38
MAIE L. REv. 283 (1986); David R. Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on
Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 195 (1985); William A. Erickson, Note, Judicial Review of
Medical Malpractice Legislation, 20 SusioK U. L. REv. 523 (1986); Larry S. Milner, Note, The Consti-
tutionality of Medical Malpractice Reform: A National Survey, 18 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 1053 (1987); Clay
B. Tousey, Jr., Comment, Medical Malpractice Statutes: Special Protection for a Privileged Few, 12 N.
KY. L. REv. 295 (1985); Clay B. Tousey, Jr., Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to
the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
26. See generally PATRIcIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MA'LPRAcncE: THEORY, EvmENcE AND Pumuc
POLICY 97-117 (1985); Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MrrcmELL L.
Rev. 417 (1986); Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759 (1977); Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis
of the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CoNT=MP. PROBS. 5 (1986); Francis C. Borgiovonni, Note, The
Illinois Legislature's Attempt to Resolve the Insurance Crisis: Too Much Tort Reform and Too Little
Insurance Regulation, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 159 (1987).
27. Medical malpractice insurers are one of several types of insurers that make up the property and
casualty insurance industry. The following Table reveals the number of insolvent property and casualty
insurers for the period 1970-1979:
TABLE 6
PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURER INSOLVENCIES 1970-79
Number of Number of
Year Insolvent Carriers Year Insolvent Carriers
1970 4 1975 20
1971 8 1976 6
1972 2 1977 6
1973 2 1978 6
1974 5 1979 3
1991]
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1980's were plagued by a medical malpractice insurance afford-
ability crisis. 28 This was a period in which the cost of some cat-
egories of medical malpractice insurance policies 29 exceeded the
dollar amount many health care providers were willing or able to
pay. 30
Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Criisi and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YAM J. ON
REG. 455, 482 (1988). See generally Paul G. Roberts, Note, Insurance Company Insolvencies and Insurance
Guaranty Funds: A Look at the Nonduplication of Recovery Clause, 74 IowA L. REv. 927 (1989) (discussing
insurance industry insolvencies); see also Richard S. L. Roddis & Richard E. Stewart, The Insurance of
Medical Losses, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1281 (discussing problems posed for insurers providing medical malpractice
insurance).
28. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 Omo ST.
L.J. 399 (1987); Robert L. Habush, The Insurance Crisis: Reality or Myth? A Plaintiffs' Lawyer's Per-
spective, 64 DEN. U.L. R-v. 641 (1988); Susan Porter, Is Ohio Heading for Another Malpractice Crisis,
81 Omo ST. MED. J. 29 (1985); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); Leonard W. Schroeter & William J. Rutzick, Tort Reform: Being an Insurance
Company Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 31 (1986). But see Frank P. Grad,
Medical Malpractice and The Crisis of Insurance Availability: The Waning Options, 36 CAsE W. Ras. L.
REv. 1058 (1985) (arguing that in the 1980's an availability crisis, not an affordability crisis was experienced).
29. A few commentators concluded that "[s]ignificant changes in the manner in which tort liability
is established and damages assessed are cited as causes of dramatic rate increases." Richard N. Clarke, et
al., Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 389
(1988). However, another commentator has concluded that "increases in premium prices are generally
justified. The increases are ... an attempt to price insurance at levels commensurate with estimated cash
flows." Nelson Lacey, The Competitiveness of the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry: A Look at Market
Equity Values and Premium Prices, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 501, 515 (1988). The following Table presents the
percentage increase of premiums in selected states between the period January 1986 and July 1987:
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN PREMIUM RATES FOR SELECTED












Note: The Table reflects increases in rates by physician-owned insurers.
Mark Crane, Nobody's Laughing at Bedpan Mutuals Now, MEDICAL EcoNowmcs, April 18, 1988, at 125.
30. The following Table presents the median gross income for selected medical specialists for the
year 1986:
TABLE 8
MEDIAN GROSS INCOME OF SELECTED MEDICAL SPECIALISTS FOR THE YEAR 1986
[Vol. 94
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The availability and affordability dramas were ostensibly major
subissues in the larger context of the health care cost crisis that
has engulfed the nation for two decades. 31 In order to appreciate
how the availability and affordability issues were used effectively
to promote tort reform, 32 we will first look at the health care cost










Arthur Owens, Doctors Earnings on the Rise Again, MEnicAL EcoNoMIcs, September 7, 1987, at 219.
31. Commentators have attributed excessive health care costs to other factors, such as medical waste,
defensive medicine, and the expense of new technology. See generally Karen S. Edwards, Defensive Medicine:
Health Care with a Pricetag, 81 Osno ST. Mn. J. 38 (1985); David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler,
Cost Without Benefit: Administrative Waste in U.S. Health Care, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 441 (1986);
John K. Iglehart, The Cost and Regulation of Technology: Future Policy Directions, 55 MBArNK MENI.
FuNt) Q. 25 (1977); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A
Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CAsE W. Rss. L. REv. 778 (1985); Thomas W. Moloney & David E. Rogers,
Medical Technology: A Different View of the Contentious Debate Over Costs, 301 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1413 (1979); Seymour Perry & Flova Chu, Commentary: Health Care Cost Containment and Technology
Assessment, 36 CAsE W. Rs. L. Rsv. 884 (1985); Eric L. Richards, Antitrust and the Future of Cost
Containment Efforts in the Health Profession, 62 NEB. L. REv. 49, 51-55 (1983); Schroeder, Curbing the
High Costs of Medical Advances, 1 Bus. & HEALTH 7 (1984).
32. The following Table illustrates how states responded to selected reform measures:
TABLE 9
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT REFORM MEASURES ENACTED BY STATES AS OF 1987
Damage Periodic Collateral Conting.
State Cap Payment Source Rule Fee Arbitration
Ala. yes yes yes no yes
Alaska yes yes yes no yes
Ariz. no no yes yes no
Cal. yes yes yes yes yes
Colo. yes no yes yes no
Conn. no no yes yes no
Del. no no yes yes no
Fla. no yes yes yes yes
Ga. yes no yes no yes
Haw. yes no no yes no
Idaho yes no no no no
Ill. no yes yes yes yes
Ind. yes no yes yes no
Iowa no no yes yes no
Kan. yes yes no yes no
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Although there are numerous health care cost indicators or ba-
rometers, 33 we will focus strictly upon costs for community hos-
pitals,34 medicare, and medicaid.35 The average cost to community
La. yes yes no no yes
Me. no yes no yes no
Md. yes no no yes no
Mass. yes no yes yes no
Mich. yes yes yes yes yes
Minn. yes no yes no no
Mo. yes yes no no no
Mont. no yes yes no no
Neb. yes no yes yes no
N.H. yes no no yes no
N.J. no no yes yes no
N.M. yes yes no no no
N.Y. no yes yes yes yes
N.D. no yes yes no no
Ohio yes yes yes no yes
Okla. no no no yes no
Ore. yes no yes yes no
R.I. no yes yes no no
S.C. no yes no no no
S.D. yes yes yes no yes
Tenn. no no yes yes no
Tex. yes no no no no
Utah yes yes yes yes yes
Vt. no no no no yes
Va. yes no no no yes
Wash. yes yes yes yes no
W.Va. yes no no no no
Wis. yes no no yes no
Wym. no no no yes no
Note: Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, and North Carolina did not enact any of the measures
listed, so they were excluded here. Further, several states had positive entries from this list that are shown
as negative entries because they were repealed.
What the States Have Tried, MEDIcAL EcoNomncs, Apr. 10, 1988, at 208-09.
33. See generally SOURCE BOOK OF HEa.LT I suRA~cE DATA (1970-1989).
34. For a discussion on community hospitals, see Ting and Valiante, Future Capital Needs of Com-
munity Hospitals, I HEALT Asp. 14 (1982); Kenneth R. Wing & Burton Craige, Health Care Regulation:
Dilemma of a Partially Developed Public Policy, 57 N.C. L. Ray. 1165 (1979). The following Table prescnts
community hospital costs for the period 1970-1987:
TABLE 10
AVERAGE COST TO COMMUNITY HOSPITALS
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hospitals per patient increased by 58.4%36 during the period 1970
to 1974, 61.9% for the period 1975 to 1979, 37 and 62.6% for the
period 1980 to 1984.38 The average cost per patient stay increased
57.2% for the period 1970 to 1974, 39 61.4% for the period 1975
to 197940 and 61.8% for the period 1980 to 1984. 41
1982 327.37 2,500.52 7.6
1981 284.33 2,171.20 7.6
1980 245.12 1,850.96 7.6
1979 217.34 1,641.48 7.6
1978 194.34 1,474.21 7.6
1977 174.00 1,322.40 7.6
1976 151.80 1,168.90 7.7
1975 133.80 1,030.30 7.7
1974 113.60 886.10 7.8
1973 102.40 798.70 7.8
1972 105.30 831.70 7.9
1971 92.31 738.48 8.0
1970 81.01 664.28 8.2
SoUrCaE BooK, supra note 2 at 61 [hereinafter Table 10].
35. For a general discussion of medicaid and medicare, see RASHi FaN, MEDICAL CARE MEDIcAL
CosTs, 53-124 (1986); Marian Gornick, et al., Twenty Years of Medicare and Medicaid: Covered Popu-
lations, Use of Benefits, and Program Expenditures, 7 HrALTH CAE FIN. REv. 13 (Supp. 1985); Robert
W. Rosenblum, Medicare Revisted: A Look Through the Past to the Future, 9 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y
& L. 669 (1985); Kenneth R. Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Program,
33 CATH. U. L. Ry. 1 (1983). The following Table presents medicare and medicaid benefit payments:
TABLE 11
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID PAYMENTS AND POPULATION SERVED DURING 1972-1987
MEDICARE MEDICAID
Population Payment Population Payment
Year (millions) (millions) (millions) (millions)
1972 21.3 $ 8,643 17.6 $ 6,300
1973 23.5 9,583 19.6 8,639
1974 24.2 12,418 21.5 9,983
1975 25.0 15,588 22.0 12,242
1976 25.7 18,420 22.8 14,091
1977 26.5 21,773 22.8 16,239
1978 27.2 24,919 22.0 17,992
1979 27.9 29,313 21.5 20,472
1980 28.5 35,686 21.6 23,311
1981 29.0 43,442 22.0 27,204
1982 29.5 51,086 21.6 29,399
1983 30.0 57,443 21.6 32,391
1984 30.5 62,870 21.6 33,895
1985 31.1 70,391 21.8 37,507
1986 31.7 74,187 22.5 41,027
1987 32.4 79,904 23.2 45,098
SOURCE BooK, supra note 2 at 32-33 [hereinafter Table 11].
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These cost increases might not have been problematic for the
health care system if the system had experienced proportional in-
creases in demand for services from community hospitals. How-
ever, there are strong data to suggest that the demand on
community hospitals actually decreased. The average length of a
community hospital stay (in days) decreased by 4.9% for the pe-
riod 1970 to 1974,42 1.3% for the period 1975 to 1979, 41 and 40.0%
for the 1980 to 1984 period."
The problem of cost outpacing service demand 45 is further il-
lustrated through medicare and medicaid programs. For the period
1972 to 1976, medicare enrollment increased by 20%, while pay-
ments increased 113. 1%.46 Medicaid figures for the same period
revealed a 29.5% increase in recipients with a 123.7% increase in
cost. 47 Medicare enrollment increased 9.4% from 1977 to 1981,
while payments increased 99.5%.48 The medicaid recipient popu-
lation decreased by 3.5% during this time, while cost increased
67.5%. 49 For the period 1982 to 1986, medicare enrollment in-
creased 9.8%, while payments increased 56.4%0.5 0 The medicaid
population increased 4.2% during this period and cost increased
39.5% .51
These health care cost barometers provide a mere glimpse of
the magnitude of the deepening health care cost crisis that occurred
during the 1970's and 80's.12 These data support the premise that






45. One of the fundamental principles of economics is that of the inverse relation between price
charged and quantity demanded. RicHARD A. Pos~m, ECONOMIC ANALYsis oF LAw 4-5 (3d ed. 1986).
This principle suggests that a rise in hospital costs, not attributed to an increase in patient service demand,
would result in a decrease in patient service demand, provided a suitable substitute was available.






52. See supra notes 2 and 3.
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the skyrocketing increases. During the 1970's, health care providers
and medical malpractice insurers offered explanations for the bi-
zarre cost increases which ultimately led to amendments of several
state tort laws.5 3
During the 1970's, health care providers attributed rising health
care costs to the rise in medical malpractice insurance that had to
be passed on to patients5 4 and the practice of defensive medicine1
5
as a consequence of the decrease in medical malpractice insurers.
Insurers offered the following explanation for their role in health
care costs: the manifold increase in medical malpractice tort
litigation 56 and verdict awards5 7 not only caused premiums to in-
crease,58 but also caused many insurers to leave the market.
5 9
53. See supra note 32.
54. Although no exact figure is ascertainable, it is generally acknowledged that a fair percentage of
premium cost "is passed on to patients in the form of higher fees for medical services." PATRICIA M.
DAizoN, MEDIcAL MALURAcncE 132 (1985). See infra note 65.
55. Defensive medicine "has been estimated to cost at least $15 billion and perhaps as much as $40
billion." Max W. Fine & Jonathan H. Sunshine, Malpractice Reform Through Consumer Choice and
Consumer Education: Are New Concepts Marketable?, LAw & CoNTaMP. PRoBs., Spring 1986, at 213,
215. James E. Ludlam, Payment Systems, Cost Management, and Malpractice, HosprrAis, Nov. 1, 1984,
at 102. See generally The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DuKrE L.J.
939; David Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1179,
1189-1192; Laurence R. Tancredi & Jeremiah A. Barondress, The Problem of Defensive Medicine, ScIENCE,
May 26, 1978, at 879; Zuckerman, Medical Malpractice: Claims, Legal Costs, and the Practice of Defensive
Medicine, 3 HEAT AFaAms 128 (1984). The following Table presents cost data for additional medical
services (defensive medicine) for the year 1987:
TABLE 12
DEFENSIVE MEDICINE COST PER PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN DISTRIBUTION
Additional Cost Physician Per Patient Distribution









How Much Doctors' Defensive Tactics Raised Patients' Costs Last Year, MEDIcAL EcoNolacs, Apr. 18,
1988, at 100.
56. See PranucIA M. DANZON, MEDicAL MAu'aAcTIcE 58-83 (1985).
57. Id.
58. One commentator has concluded "that fluctuations in premiums and availability of insurance
is inevitable in an environment of uncertainty such as that resulting from the unpredictability of common
1991]
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Several states reformed their tort laws during the 1970's in an
effort to curtail the impact of verdict awards in medical mal-
practice litigation.60 By the 1980's, the availability crisis had sub-
sided.61 However, health care costs continued to soar.6 2
Once the 1970's availability argument lost its force, health care
providers and insurers searched for another general theory to ex-
plain continued rising health care costs. The theory chosen for the
1980's was that of affordability.6 3 Health care providers argued
tort law." Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 455, 457 (1988). The following Table presents assessed medical malpractice premium
charges by insurers for the period 1975-1986:
TABLE 13
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS WRITTEN BY INSURERS
FOR THE PERIOD 1975-1986
Annual %
Year Premiums Written Change












Note: Medical malpractice premiums were previously included in the general liability category of insurers
and were not separately tabulated until 1975.
INstANCE INFORMATON INSrrrtrrE, PRoPERIY/CAsu.TY FACT BooK 29 (1987-88).
59. It has been suggested by one commentator that governmental regulation in the insurance industry
was a factor in causing insurers to leave the medical malpractice market. Specifically, the commentator
reported that "[d]enial of requested rate increases or approval of the claims-made form, or both, were
directly responsible for the withdrawal of the group carrier in New York, northern California, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and South Carolina, for example." PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICA J MA-
PaR~cc 108 (1985).
60. See supra note 32.
61. The availability crisis subsided largely because "[t]he majority of states passed legislation which
provided for the availability of medical malpractice insurance by establishing joint underwriting agencies,
i.e., insurance pools that were to carry the obligation of malpractice insurance, or by authorizing the
establishment of mutual insurance companies by physician organizations or medical societies." Frank P.
Grad, Medical Malpractice and the Crisis of Insurance Availability: The Waning Options, 36 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 1058, 1076-1077 (1985).
62. The average rate of growth for national health care expenditure for the period 1980-1984 was
12.7%. See Table 2, supra note 3.
63. See supra note 28.
[Vol. 94
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that a renewed escalation in the cost of malpractice insurance had
to be borne by patients (as in the 1970's) in order for the health
care system to remain sound.64 The insurers argued, as they did
in the 1970's, that they had to increase premium costs due to con-
tinued increases in medical malpractice litigation and verdict
awards .65
Many state legislatures accepted the affordability theory and
continued the tort reform process begun in the 1970's.66 By the
64. Fees charged by physicians reflect the cost of medical malpractice insurance, though the full
extent is not known. For a general discussion of physician fees, see Pamela J. Farley, Theories of the
Price and Quantity of Physician Services, 5 J. HEAI.TH ECON. 315 (December 1986); Jonathan A. Showstack,
et al., Fee-for-Service Physician Payment: Analysis of Current Methods and Their Development, 16 INQUIRY
230 (1979). The following Table presents a comparison of percentage increases in physician fees and the
consumer price index:
TABLE 14.
PERCENTAGE GROWTH IN PHYSICIANS' FEES
AS COMPARED TO THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX







Physicians' Fees and the CPI, MEaicA. EcoNozflcs, October 2, 1989, at 78.
65. See generally E. Kathleen Adams & Stephen Zuckerman, Variation in the Growth and Incidence
of Medical Malpractice Claims, 9 J. HEALTH POL., & POL'Y L. 475 (1984); Patricia M. Danzon, The Effects
of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 413
(1987); Myran F. Steves, Jr., A Proposal to Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationships in the Medical
Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1305, 1309-1316. The following Table presents
the median premium charges for selected specialists for the periods 1983 and 1988:
TABLE 15.
MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS FOR SELECTED
MEDICAL SPECIALIST
Specialist Premium Cost 1983 Premium Cost 1988 Percentage Change
OBG $11,840.00 $34,170.00 189.0%0
Pediatrician 2,030.00 5,680.00 180.0
Neurosurgeon 16,000.00 43,500.00 172.0
G. Surgeon 8,500.00 22,500.00 165.0
Internist 2,430.00 6,090.00 151.0
Premiums Have Been Soaring Across the Board, MEDICAL ECONOMnCS, Jan. 16, 1989, at 174.
66. It has been determined that "[d]uring 1986, fifteen states passed legislation that limited the amount
of recovery for noneconomic losses." Jane C. Arancibia, Note, Statutory Caps on Damage Award in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 13 OKa. Crry U. L. Rnv. 135, 141 (1988). See generally, Nancy L. Manzer,
Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on
Joint and Several Liability, 73 CoasEa L. REv. 628 (1988).
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end of the 1980's, most states reformed some aspect of their tort
system in an effort to decrease health care costs.6 7
B. Types of Reform Measures8
During the availability and affordability crisis, tort reformers
successfully linked the cost of medical malpractice insurance to
the rising costs of health care. 69 This acted as a battering ram in
a national assault upon state tort laws. In one solid lobbying voice,
tort reformers insisted that reformation of state tort systems would
lead to a significant decrease in the cost of health care. 70 Tort
reformers supported their position with two secondary arguments.
They argued that: (1) the doctrinal rules governing tort actions
were unfair and inappropriate for medical malpractice litigation; 7'
and (2) the civil justice system permitted an explosive increase in
the number and size of medical malpractice verdicts.72
The doctrinal rules argument can be summarized under six cat-
egories: 73 (1) tort rules favored plaintiffs; 74 (2) statutes of limitation
67. See supra note 32.
68. See generally Gary T. Dance, Medical Malpractice: Prelitigation Screening Panels in Idaho, 19
IDAHo L. REv. 31 (1983); Kevin G. Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland's
Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REv. 74 (1980); Steven R. Ripps, The Ohio
Medical Malpractice Statute: An Analysis, 4 Omo N.U. L. REv. 24 (1977); Stephen A. Hurst, Comment,
Alternatives to Litigation: Pretrial Screening and Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Has Missouri
Taken a Giant Step Backward?, 50 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 182 (1982); Dean A. Lerner, Note, Iowa Code
Section 14Z136, Which Abolishes the Collateral Source Rule in Medical Malpractice Cases, is Not Un-
constitutional Based on a Rational Relationship Test, 29 DRArE L. REv. 849 (1980); Karlen J. Moe,
Comment, The Montana Medical Malpractice Panel Act: Origin, Procedure, and Effect, 44 MONT. L. REv.
281 (1983); B. Richard Young, Comment, Medical Malpractice in Florida: Prescription for Change, 10
FJA. ST. U. L. REv. 593 (1983).
69. By indicating a successful linkage of the two issues, it is not to be inferred that the linkage
resulted in a successful resolution of either problem.
70. Of course, health care expenditure continued to increase throughout the 1970's and 1980's. See
Table 1, supra note 2, and Table 2, note 3.
71. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians' Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A
Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of "Tort Reform", 23 GA. L. REv. 295, 310 (1989).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally Katherine R. Bowden, Comment, Standard of Care for Medical Practitioners:
Abandonment of the Locality Rule, 60 Ky. L.J. 209 (1971); Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the
Truth: Physicians' Duty to Disclose Medical Mistakes, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 52 (1980); Wayne D. Lan-
dsverk, Note, Informed Consent as a Theory of Medical Liability, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 879; Mary E. Mann,
Note, Medical Specialist May Be Found Negligent as a Matter of Law Despite Compliance with the Cus-
tomary Practice of the Specialty, 28 VAND. L. REv. 441 (1975).
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were too long;75 (3) inappropiate rules for compensatory relief;76
(4) inappropriate rules for punitive damages; 77 (5) unfair admin-
istrative costs; 78 and (6) lack of a mechanism to deter frivolous
claims .79
The second argument raised by tort reformers is straight for-
ward. During the 1970's and 1980's, the civil justice system ex-
perienced a significant increase in the number of medical
malpractice claims filed and a marked increase in verdict awards.80
Tort reformers used both arguments effectively in revamping
tort laws in many states.81 Among the tort law changes enacted
by many states were the following: (1) damage caps;82 (2) shorter
statutes of limitation;8 3 (3) screening panels;8 4 (4) limitations on
75. See generally Paul E. Caprioglio, Note, A Four Year Statute of Limitations for Medical Mal-
practice Cases: Will Plaintiff's Case be Barred?, 2 PAciIc L.J. 663 (1971); Comment, Malpractice Statute
of Limitations in New York: Conflict and Confusion, 1 HoFsamA L. REV. 276 (1973); Darryl S. Vhuger,
Comment, Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations in Washington, 57 WASH. L. Rsv. 317 (1982).
76. See generally, Stephen D. Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DI Eo L. REv. 795
(1987).
77. See generally, Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. Rev.
79 (1982); John D. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DAKE L. Rnv. 870 (1976); Steven
G. Schumaier & Brian A. McKinsey, The Insurability of Punitive Damages, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1986, at 68.
78. See generally David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
72 (1983).
79. See generally John M. Johnson & G. Edward Cassady, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Res-
ponses to Them - What Relief is Available?, 36 AiA. L. Rev. 927 (1985).
80. Danzon, supra note 65. See also Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46
MD. L. Rnv. 3 (1986).
81. See supra note 32.
82. See, e.g., S.D. CODIED LANWs ANN. § 21-3-11 (1987). For a discussion see, Wesley Leonard
& Marcia B. Stevens, Comment, Legislative Limitations on Medical Malpractice Damages: The Chances
of Survival, 37 MERcER L. Rev. 1583 (1986); Jason A. Parson, Note, Medical Malpractice Damage Caps:
Navigating the Safe Harbors, 65 VAsH. U. L.Q. 565 (1987); Lisa A. Treviranus, Comment, Medical
Malpractice: Constitutional Implications of a Cap on Damages, 7 N. IL. U. L. REv. 61 (1987).
83. See, e.g., WVAsH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 4.16.350 (West Supp. 1991). For a discussion, see Jennifer
Andrews, Note, Questions Surrounding the Texas Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations, 38 BAYLoR
L. Rev. 751 (1986).
84. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 60B (Law Co-op. Supp. 1990). For a discussion, see
William J. Curran, Screening Panels in Malpractice Cases: Some Disturbing Progress Reports, 302 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 954 (1980); Stephen S. Morrill, The Illinois Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985: A
Constitutional Analysis of the Medical Review Panel Procedure, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 345 (1986); Richard
F. Boyle, Note, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: A Judicial Evaluation of Their Practical Effect, 42
U. Prrr. L. REv. 939 (1981).
1991]
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minority status; 85  (5) modification of joint and several liability
rules;8 6 (6) creation of excess insurance funds; 87 (7) abolition of
ad damnum clauses; 88 (8) periodic payment of large verdicts; 89 and
(9) limiting contingency fee arrangements. 90
C. Effectiveness of Reform
The impact of tort reform on health care expenditure is a sep-
arate issue from the impact of tort reform on medical malpractice
litigation and the cost of medical malpractice insurance. While
data exist which suggest that tort reform has not significantly af-
fected the cost of health care9' and malpractice insurance, 92 it may
have had some significant effect on medical malpractice litiga-
tion. 93
Data relating to the issue of health care expenditure reveals the
steady increase of health care cost as a percentage of the gross
national product. From 1970 to 1974, national health care expen-
diture increased by 54.8%. The average rate of health care ex-
85. See, e.g., N.C. Gm. STAT. § 1-17(b) (Supp. 1990). For a discussion, see Cheryl L. Hamer, The
Repeal of Washington's Infant Tolling Statute in Medical Malpractice Cases: State Constitutional Challenges,
22 GoNz. L. REv. 133 (1986); Roger L. Pardieck, The Disappearing Rights of Plaintiffs Under a Legal
Disability, 20 IND. L. REv. 385 (1987).
86. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1431.1-1431.5 (Deering Supp. 1991). For a discussion, see Thomas
V. Harris, Washington's 1986 Tort Reform Act: Partial Tort Settlements After the Demise of Joint and
Several Liability, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 67 (1986); Mike Steenson, Recent Legislative Responses to the Rule
of Joint and Several Liability, 23 TORT INS. L.J. 482 (1988). 0
87. See, e.g., Im. CODE ANN. § 16-9.54-1 (Bums Supp. 1991). For a discussion, see Robin B.
Stickney, 1985 Amendments to the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, 19 ND. L. REv. 403, 409-411 (1986).
88. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7 (1987). For a discussion, see Prentiss E. Feagles et al.,
Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DuKE L.J.
1417, 1451-1453.
89. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6864 (1989). For a discussion, see Donovan Flora, Periodic
Payment of Judgments in Washington, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 155 (1986); Roger C. Henderson, Designing a
Responsible-Periodic Payment System for Tort Awards: Arizona Enacts a Prototype, 32 AiZ. L. REv.
21 (1990).
90. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-568 (1982). For a discussion, see Philip H. Corboy,
Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse Door, Lmo., Summer 1976, at 27; Roger
Feldman, The Determinants of Medical Malpractice Incidents: Theory of Contingency Fees and Empirical
Evidence, ATL. ECON. J., July 1979, at 59; Ralph Slovenko, Medical Malpractice and the Lawyer's Con-
tingent Fee, 12 J. PSYcHIATRY & L. 587 (1984).
91. See Table 1, supra note 2 and Table 2, note 3.
92. See Table 13, supra note 58.
93. Danzon, supra note 65.
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penditure growth for this period was 12.0%, while it averaged
7.7% of the gross national product.94 Health care expenditure for
the period 1975 to 1979 increased by 61.8% with an average rate
of growth of 13.0%. As a percentage of the gross national product,
health care expenditure averaged 8.5% for this period. 95 For the
period 1980 to 1985, there was an increase in health care expen-
diture of 55.9%. Its average growth rate was 12.7% and it av-
eraged 9.901o of the gross national product.
96
The most revealing factor from the above data is the steady
increase of health care cost as a percentage of gross national pro-
duct. The question which the scope of this article is not prepared
to answer, and one which other commentators have not posed, is
whether health care expenditure would have taken a larger bite
out of the gross national product if tort reform had not taken
place. The answer to this question is of central concern for future
state and federal legislation designed to reverse the direction of
health care costs.
Data regarding federal spending as a percentage of national
health care expenditure break down as follows: (1) For the period
1970 to 1974, federal spending for health care increased 75.1%,
averaging 24.7% of health care expenditure, and (2) from 1975 to
1979, federal spending for health care increased 64.9% and av-
eraged 28.2% of health care expenditure. Spending by the federal
government for the period 1980 to 1984 increased 57.6%, aver-
aging 29% of health care expenditure.
9 7
On the state level, spending for national health care increased
64.3% during the period 1970 to 1974, while state spending as a
percentage of health care expenditure was 13.70Wo. From 1975 to
1979, state spending for health care increased 54.4%, while it av-
eraged 13.8% as a percentage of health care expenditure. For the
period 1980 to 1984, state spending for health care increased 40.8%,
94. See Table 1, supra note 2.
95. Id.
96. See Table 2, supra note 3.
97. See Table 3, supra note 4.
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while averaging 13.1076 for this period as a percentage of health
care expenditure. 98
While federal and state spending for health care services may
seem alarming in the midst of reform measures designed to de-
crease costs, personal consumption expenditures reveal greater
concerns about the ineffectiveness of the reform measures. During
the period 1970 to 1974, personal consumption expenditures for
hospital services increased 71.1% and expenses for physician serv-
ices increased 45.007o. From 1975 to 1979, personal consumption
expenditures for hospital services increased 74.6% and for phy-
sician services increased 54.6%. For the period 1980 to 1984, per-
sonal consumption expenditures for hospital services increased
59.3% and for physician services increased 59.8%. 99
The data presented above do not factor out the impact of in-
flation on health care costs. In spite of this omission, the mag-
nitude of the percentage increases suggests that inflation was not
a crucial issue.
Although studies have shown that tort reform has impacted in
some areas of medical malpractice litigation, 00 no study has re-
vealed that the reforms have had a significant impact on medical
malpractice insurance costs. 10 1 The results of a study designed to
determine the frequency and severity of malpractice claims for the
period 1975 to 1984 for states enacting tort reform measures 0 2
revealed the following: (1) shorter statutes of limitation reduced
claim frequency by 8.0%; (2) abolished or modified collateral source
rules reduced claim severity up to 18.0% and reduced claim fre-
quency by 14.0%; (3) damage caps reduced claim severity by 23.0%,
and; (4) none of the other measures (e.g., screening panels and
98. See Table 4, supra note 5.
99. See Table 5, supra note 7.
100. Danzon, supra note 65.
101. See Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970s: An
Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL., PoL'y & L. 629 (1985) (where the commentator concluded that
reforms did not have an impact on the cost of premiums).
102. Danzon, supra note 65.
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limits on contingency fees) had any significant impact on claim
frequency or severity. 10 3
As the nation begins to move through the 1990's, the awesome
specter of runaway health care costs continues to haunt us. During
the preceding two decades, many states attempted to halt this men-
acing cost creature by rewriting tort laws. Tort reform has failed
to have a significant impact on health care costs. Any continued
efforts to attack the problem through tort reform appear to be
futile. The ultimate resolution to controlling health care costs lies
beyond tort reform.
III. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TORT REFORM IN WEST VIRGINIA
104
West Virginia's experience with medical malpractice is no better
or worse than that of other states. 05 The efforts of West Virginia
in assuring its citizens qualified and competent doctors is traceable
to its prosecution of Dent v. State of West Virginia.0 6 This oft-
cited case10 7 involved the prosecution of an individual "in the State
103. Id. The Danzon study was drawn into question by the different conclusion reached by Professor
Sloan. Sloan, supra note 101.
104. During a meeting with a group of business persons in Bluefield, West Virginia, in 1986, state
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Miller was quoted as saying the following regarding the medical malpractice
litigation explosion:
There has been no increase in court case filings in our state for the last five years. We just
don't have that kind of litigation explosion that people talk about and that occur in other states
such as California. The jury verdicts in our state are not outrageous or excessive in the main.
West Virginia News Briefs, UPI, June 24, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
105. For a general discussion of the development of medical malpractice law in West Virginia, see
Michael J. Farrell, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia, 82 W. VA. L. Rav. 251 (1979);
Hale J. Posten, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 35 (1934) wherein
the commentator concluded that:
It]he law of medical malpractice in West Virginia has developed slowly and, in general, con-
sistently ....
iThere is an uneasiness in some quarters regarding our system of resolving medical malpractice
cases .... The concern to be addressed is the protection of the injured patient's rights without
a premature destruction of the medical doctor's career.
Id. at 283. See also FRaaN4u D. CLEc-KIY, HEALi CARE AND TaE LAw (1979); E. PERRY JOHNSON &
JOSEPH S. BEESON, SuRvEY OF WEST VmonIA LAw AFcTING DELivERY OF HEALTH CaE (1973).
106. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). See also Lawson v. Conaway, 16 S.E. 564 (W. Va. 1892); Kuhn v. Brown-
field, 12 S.E. 519 (V. Va. 1890).
107. E.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991); Broving-Ferris Indus. of
Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); O'Bannon v. Town Court
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Circuit Court of Preston County, West Virginia, for unlawfully
engaging in the practice of medicine ... without a diploma, cer-
tificate, or license . ... 101 After finding the state's statute re-
quiring physicians be licensed was not unconstitutional, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction.
In spite of the state's longstanding commitment of assuring its
citizens qualified and competent doctors, 10 9 medical malpractice
has persisted. The state's legal system, however, has been vigilant
in enforcing the rights of victims of medical malpractice through
its tort laws. 10 That is, the legal system has been a dutiful mech-
Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773 (1980); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
For examples of periodicals citing the Dent opinion, see Elizabeth H. Hadley, Nurses and Prescriptive
Authority: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 15 AM. J.L. & Mm. 245 (1989); Thomas L. Jipping, Informed
Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 329 (1988); Toni M. Massaro & Thomas
L. O'Brien, Constitutional Limitations, on State-Imposed Continuing Competency Requirements for Licensed
Professionals, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 253 (1983); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the
Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405 (1983); Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz,
Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry,
40 VAND. L. REv. 445 (1987); James M. Peterson, Note, Massachusetts Medical Society v. Dukakis: Are
Medicare Beneficiaries Better Off?., 14 J. CoNTEmp. L. 151 (1988).
108. Dent, 129 U.S. at 117.
109. The state legislature's efforts to control the quality and competency of doctors practicing in West
Virginia can be seen through the following examples of legislation aimed at addressing this area: State
Board of Health Act, 1881 W. Va. Acts ch. 60, amended and replaced by 1980 W. Va. Acts ch. 83,
codified at W. VA. CODE § 30-3-1 to 17; State Department of Health Act, 1915, W. Va. Acts ch. 11, §
12, amended and replaced by 1980 W. Va. Acts ch. 83, codified at W. VA. CODE § 30-3-11; Osteopathic
Physicians and Surgeon Act, 1923 W. Va. Acts ch. 40, as amended, codified at W. VA. CODE § 30-14-
1 to 15; Board of Chiropractic Examiners Act, 1925 W. Va. Acts ch. 20, as amended, codified at W.
VA. CODE § 30-16-1 to 17; Medical Licensing Board Act, 1949 W. Va. Acts ch. 97, repealed by 1980 W.
Va. Acts ch. 83.
110. See, e.g., Davis v. Wang, 400 S.E.2d 230 (W. Va. 1990) (malpractice resulted in death of patient);
Hulmes v. Catterson, 388 S.E.2d 313 (,V. Va. 1989) (malpractice resulting from misdiagnosis); Morris v.
Boppana, 387 S.E.2d 302 (W. Va. 1989) (malpractice led to amputation of patient's leg); Sansom v.
Physicians Assoc., Inc., 386 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1989) (malpractice led to death of automobile accident
patient); Martin v. Charleston Area Medical Ctr., 382 S.E.2d 502 (V. Va. 1989) (malpractice resulted in
death of patient); Shia v. Chvasta, 377 S.E.2d 644 (W. Va. 1989) (patient suffered stroke from negligent
administering of excessive vitamin K); Reager v. Anderson, 371 S.E.2d 619 (V. Va. 1988) (malpractice
led to amputation of patient's leg); Thomas v. Raleigh Gen. Hosp., 358 S.E.2d 222 (V. Va. 1987) (negligence
in insertion of endotracheal tube caused patient to lose normal speech); Michael v. Henry, 354 S.E.2d 590
(W. Va. 1987) (malpractice led to death of patient); Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hosp., Inc., 345 S.E.2d 791
(W. Va. 1986) (malpractice led to death of infant); Paintiff v. City of Parkersburg, 345 S.E.2d 564 (W.
Va. 1986) (negligent failure to diagnose caused patient to have an abortion); Totten v. Adongay, 337 S.E.2d
2 (W. Va. 1985) (failure to diagnose patient's broken wrist); Renner v. Asli, 280 S.E.2d 240 (,V. Va. 1981)
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anism for enforcing the rights of medical malpractice victims, until
the state's tort reformers ran roughshod over the legislature in 1986
and forced enactment of the Medical Professional Liability Act. ll '
Before discussing this Act, we think it only fair to the state leg-
islature that a discussion is given regarding other legislation in-
volving health care providers.
A. West Virginia Medical Practice Act' 12
In spite of the loud national cry for medical malpractice tort
reform during the 1970's, West Virginia's legislature did not take
action to cut off the right of its citizens to full compensation for
injuries resulting from medical malpractice. However, before the
end of the 1980's, massive pressure from the lobbying efforts of
the state's tort reformers left an indelible scar on the rights of
medical malpractice victims.
The legislature's first meaningful attempt at eradicating the real
problem behind medical malpractice, i.e., negligent and incom-
petent doctors, occurred in 1980 with the passage of the West
Virginia Medical Practice Act." 3 "Prior to the passage of this act,
(misdiagnosis of injury to patient's arm); Brown v. Bluefield Mun. Bldg. Comm'n, 280 S.E.2d 101 (W.
Va. 1981) (malpractice caused patient to have permanent kidney and renal impairment); Harrison v. Seltzer,
268 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1980) (malpractice led to amputation of patient's leg); Hilf--Clarke, 158 S.E.2d
159 (1967) (negligent cataract operation left patient blind in right eye); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144
S.E.2d 156 (V. Va. 1965) (foreign object left in patient's body); Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 142
S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1965) (negligent treatment led to death of patient).
Ill. See W. VA. CoDa § 55-7B-1 to 11 (Supp. 1990).
112. See W. VA. CODE § 30-3-1 to 17 (1986).
For a general discussion of this Act, see William N. Walker & Patricia W. Williams, The New Medical
Practice Act: Implications for Medical Discipline, 76 W. VA. MED. J. 233 (1980). For cases citing sections
of the Act see, In re Jellen, 521 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. W. Va. 1981); Mahmoodian v. United Hosp. Ctr.,
Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750 (XV. Va. 1991); Pritchard v. Catterson, 401 S.E.2d 475 (V. Va. 1990); Walton v.
Casey, 370 S.E.2d 141 (V. Va. 1988); Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Vest Virginia Bd. of Medicine, 352
S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1986); North v. Vest Virginia Bd. of Regents, 332 S.E.2d 141 (W. Va. 1985); Daily
Gazette Co., Inc. v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 326 S.E.2d 705 (W. Va. 1984).
113. The Act was summarized in its preamble as follows:
An Act ... establishing the Vest Virginia board of medicine in lieu of the medical licensing
board of West Virginia and giving it certain broad powers and duties with respect to the licensing
of the practices of medicine and surgery and podiatry and certifying of physician assistants in
the state and to the disciplining of said practices and related matters ... prescribing qualifications
for licenses to practice medicine and surgery and podiatry ... providing for biennial renewal
of licenses to practice medicine and surgery and podiatry... regulating the unauthorized practice
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a license to practice medicine in effect conferred a lifetime privilege
on an individual. Conviction of a felony was virtually the only
grounds for removal of a license. '11 4 This Act was a progressive
and bold initiative to provide effective measures for rooting out
negligent and incompetent doctors.
The Act created the West Virginia Board of Medicine."1 Aside
from having the authority to "issue a license to practice medicine
and surgery or to practice podiatry to any individual who is qual-
ified to do S0,116 the Board was also given the unprecedented
power to "independently initiate disciplinary proceedings ... based
on information received from medical peer review committees,
physicians, podiatrists, hospital administrators, professional so-
cieties and others." 1 7
The importance and significance of this Act was aptly stated
by one commentator:
This represented the first major change in the medical practice law since 1931.
It has brought West Virginia into the company of those states which are in
tune with the times and recognize the intense public interest in matters of health
policy ....
[The Act] stands as model legislation reflecting cooperation between or-
ganized medicine and our State Legislature in a truly altruistic fashion. This
law gives us opportunities and challenges to help our colleagues, as well as to
protect the public consumers of medical care. The problem of the impaired
physician is pervasive in our society, and prevention and early intervention
probably will be more effective than attempts to modify established behavior."'
of medicine and surgery and podiatry and prescribing criminal penalties and limitations; giving
broad powers to the board of medicine to discipline physicians and podiatrists; providing for
the disclosure of medical peer review committee information and reporting of professional mal-
practice and professional incompetence ... prescribing the grounds for license denial and dis-
cipline of physicians and podiatrists; relating to investigations by the board and physical and
mental examinations; providing for hearings and reporting by the board; relating to the sus-
pension, revocation, termination and restriction of licenses to practice medicine and surgery and
podiatry and the denial of applicants seeking to be so licensed, both after and before a hear-
ing ....
1980 W. Va. Acts ch. 83.
114. William N. Walker & Patricia W. Williams, supra note 112.
115. See W. VA. CODE § 30-3-5 (1986).
116. W. VA. CODE § 30-3-10(a) (1986).
117. W. VA. CODE § 30-3-14(a) (1986).
118. William N. Walker & Patricia W. Williams, supra note 112 at 233-35.
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B. Malpractice Insurance Act"19
The sweeping powers granted to the West Virginia Board of
Medicine did not bring about a halt to medical malpractice in the
state. Incompetent doctors continued to practice their negligence.
As a consequence, medical malpractice insurance premiums rose
to unprecedented heights. 2 0 Escalating costs in premiums were a
"wake-up call" for the state's tort reformers to come out of hi-
bernation. In doing so, they joined the national chorus of medical
malpractice tort reform that echoed across the nation during the
1980's.
Unfortunately, success followed the lobbying efforts of the
state's tort reformers in 1986. As a result, the state legislature
enacted two major pieces of legislation aimed at controlling the
cost of medical malpractice insurance. 21 One of those pieces of
119. Passage of this Act brought on what has been described as, "[tihe Great Malpractice Insurance
Scare of 1986 ... in West Virginia .... ." Michael Abramowitz, W. Va.'s Malpractice Insurance Crisis
Ends: Legislature Reverses Course, Eases New Curbs to Keep Firm From Ending Coverage, WASH. PosT,
May 24, 1986, at D9. The "scare" occurred because
[s]oon after the law was signed by [Governor] Moore ... the state's five largest medical mal-
practice insurance companies sent out notices to most of the 7,000 doctors and 58 hospitals in
the state that they would cancel their coverage by June [1986]. The companies asserted the bill
infringes upon their ability to make sound business judgments.
Michael Abramowitz, W. Va. Court Halts Insurer's Cancellations, WASH. PosT, May 10, 1986, at D1.
Shortly after the insurers sent out cancellation notices "the state's attorney general .. . filed suit against
the insurers, accusing them of violating West Virginia's antitrust laws. [The attorney general] sought a
temporary injunction preventing the cancellations, which was turned down by a state circuit court. However,
in a 5-0 ruling, the state Supreme Court granted the injunction .... " Id. The crisis surrounding this Act
was eventually quelled after the state legislature, in the First Extraordinary Session of 1986, amended the
Act to the satisfaction of insurers. See 1986 W. Va. Acts 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 17.
120. In a report released by the state's attorney general in 1986, it was revealed that the five largest
insurers in the state earned premiums and profits at the following levels in 1985: (a) Continental Casualty
Co., $10.6 million (earned premiums) and 73.6% (profit); (b) Ohio Hospital Insurance Co., $4.2 million
(earned premiums) and 13.2% (profit); (c) St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., $2.4 million (earned
premiums) and 58.7% (profit); (d) National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford, $423,000 (earned premiums)
and 209.2% (profit); (e) American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. $99,000 (earned premiums) and 297.8%
(profit). Report by West Virginia Attorney General Shows Profits by Insurers Ranged to 297%, [State
Developments] 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1281, at 363 (Sept. 11, 1986).
121. The following Table presents premiums paid by West Virginia health care providers and claims
paid by insurers for the period 1980-89:
TABLE 16.
PREMIUMS EARNED AND LOSSES PAID BY MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURERS IN WEST VIRGINIA 1980-89*
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legislation was the Malpractice Insurance Act. 122 This Act accom-
plished several things.1 23 First, it amended section 33-20-2 of the
West Virginia Code,124 so as to place primary regulation of medical
malpractice insurers under a separate statute. Second, the Act cre-
ated a statute specifically regulating medical malpractice insur-
ers. 125 Third, the Act created a statute regulating cancellation and
nonrenewal of medical malpractice insurance policies.
26
Direct Premiums Direct Losses
Year Earned (millions) Paid (millions)










*These figures do not include excess coverage data.
VET VIRGINIA INSURANCE COmimOssioNRm's ANNUAL REPORT (1980-89).
122. This Act was codified under three articles: W. VA. CODE § 33-20-2, §§ 33-20B-1 to 7, and §§
33-20C-1 to 5 (1988). The preamble to the Act gives its purpose as:
An Act... pertaining to... medical malpractice insurance policies only; establishing procedures
for disapproval of fdings; requiring the commissioner to hold a public hearing within the initial
sixty day waiting period on certain filings which request a rate increase; providing for review
by the commissioner of rules, rates and rating plans; requiring insurers to submit to the com-
missioner certain information annually ... requiring the commissioner, by legislative rule, to
establish methods allocating investment and other income; describing the circumstances under
which a policy of malpractice may be canceled ... requiring insurers to provide reasons for
cancellation; requiring a notice period for cancellation; requiring a sixty day notice in the case
of a nonrenewal of a policy or contract providing malpractice insurance; providing for hearings
and review to insured persons aggrieved by cancellations.
1986 W. Va. Acts 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 17.
123. For a general discussion of issues surrounding tort liability insurers, see Gary T. Schwartz, The
Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CoRumn. L. Ray. 313 (1990); Jay Angoff, In-
surance Against Competition: How The McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-
Casualty Insurance Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 397 (1988); Eliot Martin Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Con-
sidering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401 (1988);
Frank T. Herdman, Comment, Doctors, Insurers, and the Antitrust Laws, 37 BUFF. L. Ray. 789 (1988);
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); DOUoLAS
CADDY, LEGIsLATnE TRmNDS iN INSURANCE R OULATiON (1986).
124. See W. VA. CODE § 33-20-2(b)(6) (1988).
125. See W. VA. CODE §§ 33-20B-1 to 7 (Supp. 1990).
126. See W. VA. CODE §§ 33-20C-1 to 5 (Supp. 1990).
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C. Medical Professional Liability Act 127
The second major legislative initiative in 1986 in the area of
medical malpractice was enactment of the Medical Professional
Liability Act. 12 This Act, tragic in its consequences to victims of
medical negligence, carved out separate and unequal tort laws to
govern the disposition of medical malpractice actions. The "Leg-
islative Findings and Declaration of Purpose" section of the Act
states, in part:
That it is the duty and responsibility of the Legislature to balance the rights
of our individual citizens to adequate and reasonable compensation with the
broad public interest in the provision of services by qualified health care prov-
iders who can themselves obtain the protection of reasonably priced and ex-
tensive liability coverage ....
Therefore, the purpose of this enactment is to provide for . . . reforms
in the common law and statutory rights of our citizens to compensation for
injury and death .... -
The purpose of the Act, in essence, was to control the cost of
medical malpractice insurance by stripping malpractice victims of
their right to full compensation for medical negligence that caused
injuries, maiming, and death. In this part of the Article we will
briefly discuss some of the provisions of this Act.
1. Section 55-7B-3: Elements of Proof'
30
Section 55-7B-3 essentially abolished the "locality rule" in
medical malpractice actions.' Interestingly enough, the state Su-
127. See W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7B-1 to 11 (Supp. 1990).
128. During the time that we put this article together the state Supreme Court had construed only
one section of this Act, and that was section 55-7B-7. However, it has been learned that the Court recently
accepted the petition of a medical malpractice case styled Robinson v. Biswas, Civil Action No. 88-C-3685,
which should present the Court with an opportunity to interpret other sections of the Act.
129. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1 (Supp. 1990).
130. This section provides:
The following are necessary elements of proof that an injury or death resulted from the failure
of a health care provider to follow the accepted standard of care:
(a) The health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill and learning required
or expected of a reasonable, prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which
the health care provider belongs acting in the same or similar circumstances; and
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preme Court abolished the common law medical malpractice lo-
cality rule approximately three months before section 55-7B-3
became effective. The judicial ruling occurred in Paintiff v. City
of Parkersburg,132 wherein the Court stated:
[I]f a plaintiff in a malpractice action is not permitted to obtain expert tes-
timony of a physician who practices outside the domain of the defendant doc-
tor, he may be denied completely the opportunity of proving the negligent acts
of which he complains .... Much has been written about the obsolescence of
the locality rule. We have nothing to add to the oceans of ink and forests of
paper that have been pressed into service to hasten the rule's demise. We will
only add that the locality rule is abolished in West Virginia, and we shall not
miss it.1
31
The Court did not mention whether it was aware that the state
legislature was planning to abolish the locality rule by statute, so
we must assume that it was a mere coincidence that the rule was
abolished twice in the space of a few months. At any rate, section
55-7B-3 requires that a medical malpractice plaintiff prove that
the defendant failed to exercise the degree of care, skill, and learn-
ing expected of a reasonable, prudent doctor in the defendant's
profession or specialty.
While section 55-7B-3, standing alone, gives the impression that
the Act is pro-plaintiff; i.e., paves the way for plaintiffs to recover
by breaking the strangle-hold caused by the local conspiracy of
(b) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury or death.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-3 (Supp. 1990).
131. Under the strict and narrow version of this rule, the competence of an expert medical
witness to testify about standard of care is determined by his familiarity with the care ordinarily
exercised in the same locality in which the defendant practiced .... The locality rule came into
being in the 19th century and was premised upon the thought that it was unfair to hold the
country doctor to the same stringent standard as the supposedly more learned doctors practicing
in large urban centers.
Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159, 166-67 fV. Va. 1967). For a general discussion of the locality rule,
see Michael M. Belli, Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 Vni. L. Ray. 250
(1956); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. Ray. 1719
(1987); Brian Ribble-Smith & Arthur W. Hafner, The Effect of the Information Age on Physicians' Pro-
fessional Liability, 36 DEPAurL L. Ray. 69 (1986).
132. 345 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1986).
133. Id. at 567.
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silence, 13 4 this is but a discouraging illusion. The remaining sections
of the Act take away or limit fundamental rights of medical mal-
practice victims.
2. Section 55-7B-4: Health Care Injuries; Limitations of
Actions; Exceptions.'35
Section 55-7B-4 is a peculiar, if not misguided, statute of lim-
itation on medical malpractice actions. It was poorly drafted and
will no doubt require judicial interpretation to untangle its built-
in confusion. The area of concern we address relates to the sec-
tion's maximum ten-year period in which to bring a medical mal-
practice action.
134. By "conspiracy of silence" we refer to doctors being reluctant to testify against each other in
medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., Farley v. Meadows, 404 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1991). Here the plaintiffs
could not get any local doctor to be an expert witness in their medical malpractice case. Although the
plaintiffs, correctly so, attributed this to the conspiracy of silence, Justice Neely, writing for the Court,
displayed insensitivity to the dimensions of this problem by stating:
[I]t is obvious from the abundance of medical malpractice cases that go to trial around the
United States, and from the profusion of medical experts advertising their services in the back
of legal magazines, that many doctors will gladly don their boxing gloves for a reasonable fee
and testify about malpractice matters away from their own home towns.
Id. at 540.
What Justice Neely failed to take into consideration in his superficial assessment, is the cost to the
plaintiffs in Farley in having to transport a doctor into the state to act as an expert witness. This cost is
probably small for a large firm, but for a sole practitioner or small firm, the specter of having to pay
an out of state medical expert's traveling and lodging expenses - on top of the fee for testifying -
becomes a problem. Evidently this cost factor was insurmountable in Farley. For a general discussion of
the conspiracy of silence, see Joseph Kelner, The Silent Doctors - The Conspiracy of Silence, 5 U. RcH.
L. Rav. 119 (1970); Richard M. Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 Cinv.-MkasHALL L. REV. 520 (1965);
David E. Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CAne. U.L. REv. 158 (1966).
135. This section provides:
(a) A cause of action for injury to a person alleging medical professional liability against
a health care provider arises as of the date of injury, except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, and must be commenced within two years of the date of such injury, or within
two years of the date when such person discovers, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered such injury, whichever last occurs: Provided, That in no event shall any
such action be commenced more than ten years after the date of injury.
(b) A cause of action for injury to a minor, brought by or on behalf of a minor who
was under the age of ten years at the time of such injury, shall be commenced within two years
of the date of such injury, or prior to the minor's twelfth birthday, whichever provides the
longer period.
(c) The periods of limitation set forth in this section shall be tolled for any period during
which the health care provider or its representative has committed fraud or collusion by concealing
or misrepresenting material facts about the injury.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-4 (Supp. 1990).
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Subsection 55-7B-4(a) provides a limitation period for adults
to bring a medical malpractice action. This subsection requires an
action be brought no later than two years from the date of injury
or discovery of the injury, with a maximum ten-year period to
discover the injury before it is no longer actionable.
While subsection 55-7B-4(a) is more or less clear in its intent,
subsection 55-7B-4(b) is a little more difficult to interpret. Sub-
section 55-7B-4(b) states that if a minor under the age of ten suf-
fers a medical malpractice injury, he or she must bring an action
prior to his or her twelfth birthday or within two years of the
date of the injury. The question we have, which the section does
not explicitly or implicitly answer, is whether or not the maximum
ten-year period of discovery in subsection 55-7B-4(a) applies to
subsection 55-7B-4(b). The issue lends itself to valid arguments
either way.
Subsection 55-7B-4(b) takes a draconian-like bite out of the
rights of minors when section 55-2-15136 is taken into consideration.
Under section 55-2-15, the statute of limitations for bringing a tort
cause of action may be tolled for minors until they reach majority
age. Subsection 55-7B-4(b) appears to abrogate this right for mi-
nors who are victims of medical malpractice.
3. Section 55-7B-5: Health Care Actions; Complaint;
Specific Amount of Damages Not To Be Stated.
3 7
Section 55-7B-5 is one of the few straightforward and unam-
biguous sections in the Act. This section states, in part, that "[i]n
136. This section provides:
If any person to whom the right accrues to bring any such personal action, suit or scire
facias, or any such bill to repeal a grant, shall be, at the time the same accrues, an infant or
insane, the same may be brought within the like number of years after his becoming of full
age or sane that is allowed to a person having no such impediment to bring the same after the
right accrues, or after such acknowledgment as is mentioned in section eight [§ 55-2-8] of this
article, except that it shall in no case be brought after twenty years from the time when the
right accrues.
W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15 (1981).
137. This section provides:
In any medical professional liability action against a health care provider, no specific dollar
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any medical professional liability action against a health care pro-
vider, no specific dollar amount or figure may be included in the
complaint .... ,,138 In effect, section 55-7B-5 abolishes the ad
damnum clause in medical malpractice actions. The utility of this
section is doubtful. Generally, in tort actions, it is likely already
reversible error to mention to the jury the amount of damages not
proven in evidence.
13 9
4. Section 55-7B-6: Pretrial Procedures.
140
Several matters are taken up in section 55-7B-6. Subsection 55-
7B-6(a) provides that, in a medical malpractice action, a man-
amount or figure may be included in the complaint, but the complaint may include a statement
reciting that the minimum jurisdictional amount established for filing the action is satisfied.
However, any party defendant may at any time request a written statement setting forth the
nature and amount of damages being sought. The request shall be served upon the plaintiff who
shall serve a responsive statement as to the damages sought within thirty days thereafter. If no
response is served within the thirty days, the party defendant requesting the statement may petition
the court in which the action is pending to order the plaintiff to serve a responsive statement.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-5 (Supp. 1991).
138. Id.
139. In Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d 388 (XV. Va. 1989), it was stated that,
This Court recently expressed disapproval of the practice of advising the jury concerning
the monetary figures of the ad damnum clause. 'In the trial of negligence cases, the better
practice is to withhold any monetary figure from the jury's consideration which might be sug-
gestive of amounts not proven in evidence.'
Id. at 396 (quoting Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618 (NV. Va. 1974) and Abdulla v. Pittsburgh & Weirton
Bus Co., 213 S.E.2d 810, 823 (NV. Va. 1975).
140. This section provides:
(a) In each medical professional liability action against a health care provider, not less than
nine nor more than twelve months following the filing of answer by all defendants, a mandatory
status conference shall be held at which, in addition to any matters otherwise required, the parties
shall:
(1) Inform the court as to the status of the action, particularly as to the identification of contested
facts and issues and the progress of discovery and the period of time for, and nature of, an-
ticipated discovery; and
(2) On behalf of the plaintiff, certify to the court that either an expert witness has or will be
retained to testify on behalf of the plaintiff as to the applicable standard of care or that under
the alleged facts of the action, no expert witness will be required. If the court determines that
expert testimony will be required, the court shall provide a reasonable period of time for obtaining
an expert witness and the action shall not be scheduled for trial, unless the defendant agrees
otherwise, until such period has concluded. It shall be the duty of the defendant to schedule
such conference with the court upon proper notice to the plaintiff.
(b) In the event that the court determines prior to trial that either party is presenting or
relying upon a frivolous or dilatory claim or defense, for which there is no reasonable basis in
fact or at law, the court may direct in any final judgment the payment to the prevailing party
1991]
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datory status conference be held not more than twelve months after
a defendant files an answer. Subsection 55-7B-6(a)(1) instructs the
parties to inform the trial court, at the mandatory status confer-
ence, of contested facts and issues and the progress of discovery.
Subsection 55-7B-6(a)(2) requires that the plaintiff inform the trial
court, at the mandatory status conference, "that either an expert
witness has or will be retained to testify on behalf of the plaintiff
as to the applicable standard of care or that under the alleged
facts of the action, no expert witness will be required."'' 41
Subsection 55-7B-6(b) has "teeth" in it, so to speak, because
it penalizes a plaintiff or defendant for alleging a frivolous claim
or defense. This subsection grants the trial court the discretion to
make a pretrial determination of whether or not a frivolous claim
or defense is being presented. If so, "the court may direct in any
final judgment the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable
litigation expenses, including deposition and subpoena expenses,
travel expenses . . . and such other expenses necessary to the main-
tenance of the action, excluding attorney's fees and expenses.' ' 42
5. Section 55-7B-7: Testimony of Expert Witness on
Standard of Care. 143
Section 55-7B-7 requires that a plaintiff provide an expert wit-
ness in a medical malpractice action to show the applicable stan-
of reasonable litigation expenses, including deposition and subpoena expenses, travel expenses
incurred by the party, and such other expenses necessary to the maintenance of the action,
excluding attorney's fees and expenses.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6 (Supp. 1990).
141. Id. § 55-7B-6(a)(2).
142. Id. § 55-7B-6(b).
143. This section provides:
The applicable standard of care and a defendant's failure to meet said standard, if at issue,
shall be established in medical professional liability cases by the plaintiff by testimony of one
or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses if required by the court. Such expert tes-
timony may only be admitted in evidence if the foundation, therefor, is first laid establishing
that: (a) The opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (b) the opinion can be testified to
with reasonable medical probability; (c) such expert witness possesses professional knowledge and
expertise coupled with knowledge of the applicable standard of care to which his or her expert
opinion testimony is addressed; (d) such expert maintains a current license to practice medicine
in one of the states of the United States; and (e) such expert is engaged or qualified in the same
or substantially similar medical field as the defendant health care provider.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-7 (Supp. 1991).
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dard of care and the defendant's failure to meet the standard.
This section was donstrued by the state Supreme Court in Gilman
v. Choi.144 This case came to the court on a certified question from
the Circuit Court of Mason County. The Court was asked to de-
cide whether section 55-7B-7 was in conflict with Rule 702 of the
West Virginia Rules of Evidence which provides that an individual
may testify as an expert if he or she is qualified because of knowl-
edge, skill, experience, training, or education. The Court failed to
answer the question as presented by the trial court and elected,
instead, to respond by holding that section 55-7B-7 was valid under
Rule 601 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, which provides
that every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided for by statute or the rules of evidence.
1 45
6. Section 55-7B-8: Limit on Liability for Noneconomic
Loss. 146
Section 55-7B-8 is the state's damage cap provision for medical
malpractice actions; the central legislative measure tort reformers
across the nation wanted enacted by every state legislature. It es-
tablishes the sum of one million dollars as a maximum amount
of recovery for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice ac-
tions.
Although the majority of medical malpractice damage cap sta-
tutes have been construed by state supreme courts, section 55-7B-
8 has not yet been interpreted by the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals. 47 The present Court may or may not find the section
unconstitutional, but the language in Sargent v. Malcomb 4 sug-
gests that the issue of noneconomic damages is a question for the
jury:
144. 406 S.E.2d 200 ff. Va. 1990).
145. Chief Justice Neely dissented, in part, in the Gilman opinion. The Chief Justice indicated that
he believed Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence was in conflict with section 55-7B-7, and
that he would defer to the will of the legislature and hold that section 55-7B-7 prevails over Rule 702.
146. This section provides: "In any medical professional liability action brought against a health care
provider, the maximum amount recoverable as damages for noneconomic loss shall not exceed one million
dollars and the jury may be so instructed." W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1991).
147. This section is at issue in a recent case the Court has agreed to hear. See supra note 128.
148. 146 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1966).
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There is no exact formula or standard for placing a money value on such
matters as pain, suffering, and mental anguish resulting from personal injuries
or embarrassment resulting from bodily disfigurement or scars. The law rec-
ognizes that the aggregate judgment of twelve duly selected and properly qual-
ified jurors represents the best method yet devised for fixing the amount of
just compensation to the injured plaintiffs in such cases.'
4 9
The language in Sargent should be a compelling echo from the
past, guiding the present Court when it construes section 55-7B-
8. This section is a clear indication of the rich and powerful pro-
tecting themselves at the expense of the economically disadvan-
taged and politically powerless. Section 55-7B-8 is a deadly cancer,
eating away at the integrity and impartiality of our state legal
system. It must be surgically removed by the Court or through
the voting capacity of the citizens of this state.
7. Section 55-7B-9: Joint and Several Liability.5 0
The controlling or significant language in section 55-7B-9 is
found in subsection 55-7B-9(b), where it states:
149. Id. at 566.
150. This section provides:
(a) In the trial of a medical professional liability action against a health care provider
involving multiple defendants, the jury shall be required to report its findings to the court on
a form provided by the court which contains each of the possible verdicts as determined by the
court.
(b) In every medical professional liability action, the court shall make findings as to the
total dollar amount awarded as damages to each plaintiff. The court shall enter judgment of
joint and several liability against every defendant which bears twenty-five percent or more of
the negligence attributable to all defendants. The court shall enter judgment of several, but not
joint, liability against and among all defendants which bear less than twenty-five percent of the
negligence attributable to all defendants.
(c) Each defendant against whom a judgment of joint and several liability is entered in a
medical professional liability action pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is liable to each
plaintiff for all or any part of the total dollar amount awarded regardless of the percentage of
negligence attributable to him. A right of contribution exists in favor of each defendant who
has paid to a plaintiff more than the percentage of the total dollar amount awarded attributable
to him relative to the percentage of negligence attributable to him. The total amount of recovery
for contribution is limited to the amount paid by the defendant to a plaintiff in excess of the
percentage of the total dollar amount awarded attributable to him. No right of contribution
exists against any defendant who entered into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff prior
to the jury's report of its findings to the court or the court's findings as to the total dollar
amount awarded as to damages.
(d) Where a right of contribution exists in a medical professional liability action pursuant
to subsection (c) of this section, the findings of the court or jury as to the percentage of negligence
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In every medical professional liability action, the court shall make findings as
to the total dollar amount awarded as damages to each plaintiff. The court
shall enter judgment of joint and several liability against every defendant which
bears twenty-five percent or more of the negligence attributable to all defen-
dants. The court shall enter judgment of several, but not joint, liability against
and among all defendants which bear less than twenty-five percent of the neg-
ligence attributable to all defendants." 1
The intent of section 55-7B-9 is to make certain that a code-
fendant whose medical malpractice caused less than twenty-five
percent of the injury to the victim is not jointly liable for the full
amount awarded as damages. The obvious dilemma this section
presents for a plaintiff is that of a situation with several code-
fendants, none of whom is found to contribute twenty-five percent
or more in causing the injury and only one of which is not judg-
ment proof. Under such a scenario, a plaintiff would get less than
twenty-five percent of the verdict award. Such a situation is un-
conscionable.
IV. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DAMAGE
CAPS'
15 2
Arguably the most controversial medical malpractice reform
initiative put forth by tort reformers was the measure calling for
and liability of the several defendants to the plaintiff shall be binding among such defendants
as determining their rights of contribution.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9 (Supp. 1991).
Further, § 55-7B-9(c) was cited recently in Board of Educ. of McDowe County v. Zando, Martin
& Milstead, Inc., 390 S.E.2d 796, 803 n.5 (V. Va. 1990).
151. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9(b).
152. See note 17 herein for a general discussion on damage cap statutes. The following list of state
statutes impose medical malpractice damage caps: ALA. CODE § 6-5-544, 6-5-547 (Supp. 1990); ALAsKA
STAT. § 09.17.010 (Supp. 1990); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering Supp. 1991); CoLO. Ray. STAT. § 13-
21-102.5(3) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.80 (West Supp. 1991); HAw. REv. STAT. § 663-8.7 (Supp. 1990);
IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Bums 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407
(Supp. 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42 (West Supp. 1991); MD. CTs. & Jun. PRoc. CODE ANN.
§ 11-108 (1989); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 231 § 60-H (Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (Vernon 1988);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (1988); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6
(Michie Supp. 1991); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Anderson 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.560(1) (1989);
S.D. CODIFID LAvs ANN. § 21-3-11 (1987); TExAS Crv. STAT. ANN. § 4590i(K) (Vest Supp. 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1984); VASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.250(d)(2)
(1988); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West Supp. 1990). See also
Table 9 supra note 32.
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a limitation on recbvery for economic'5 3 damages, noneconomic
damages, 15 4 or both; i.e., damage cap proposals. Support for this
statement can be found in the numerous legal contests that have
been fought over the validity of damage cap statutes.5  One com-
mentator captured the essence of this controversy by stating:
It is hard to imagine a statutory provision that more blatantly favors a special
class than one that limits the damages an injured person may recover from a
[physician]. No such consideration is afforded any other professional who neg-
ligently injures another person.
5 6
Of course the idea or fact of limiting verdict awards is not
confined to the area of medical malpractice. State legislatures have
153. The following statutes are examples of statutes limiting both economic and noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice cases:
In any verdict returned against a health care provider in an action for malpractice ... which
is tried by a jury or in any judgment entered against a health care provider in such an action
which is tried without a jury, the total amount recoverable for any injury to, or death of, a
patient shall not exceed one million dollars.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1984).
For a specific discussion of the statute, see M. Margaret Branham Kimmel, Comment, The Consti-
tutional Attack on Virginia's Medical Malpractice Cap: Equal Protection and the Right to Jury Trial, 22
U. Ricui. L. Rv. 95 (1987).
(a) In any medical malpractice liability action:
(1) The total amount recoverable by each party from all defendants for all claims for noneconomic
loss based on causes of action ... shall not exceed a sum total of $250,000; and
(2) ... the total amount recoverable by each party from all defendants for all claims shall not
exceed a sum total of $1,000,000.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3407 (Supp. 1990).
For a specific discussion of the statute, see Elizabeth A. Schartz et al., Comment, Caps, Crisis and
Constitutionality - Evaluating the 1986 Kansas Medical Malpractice Legislation, 35 KAN. L. Ray. 763
(1987).
154. The following statutes are examples of statutes limiting noneconomic damages in medical mal-
practice cases:
In any medical professional liability action brought against a health care provider, the maximum
amount recoverable as damages for noneconomic loss shall not exceed one million dollars and
the jury may be so instructed.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1990).
For a specific discussion of the statute, see Jill Oliverio, Note, To Cap or Not to Cap Damage
Awards: That is the Constitutional Question, 91 W. VA. L. Ray. 519 (1988).
In any action against a health care provider for damages for personal injury or death arising
out of the rendering of or the failure to render health care services, no plaintiff shall recover
more than three hundred fifty thousand dollars per occurrence for noneconomic damages from
any one defendant ....
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (Vernon 1988).
155. See infra note 167.
156. June Smith Tyler, Comment, Medical Malpractice Statutes: Special Protection for a Privileged
Few?, 12 N. KY. L. REv. 295, 313 (1985).
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found other areas in our social fabric in which to impose limi-
tations on compensation for tort.15 7 Moreover, many courts use
self-imposed legal devices such as remittitur15 8 and judgment not-
withstanding the verdict 159 to control compensation to plaintiffs.1
60
Regardless of the context in which verdict limitations have arisen,
they invariably come into conflict with the deeply-rooted rights of
plaintiffs.
1 61
Medical malpractice damage cap statutes are fundamentally an-
tithetical to the three primary objectives of tort law. 62 That is,
damage caps: (1) do not punish wrongdoers;163 (2) encourage po-
tentially harmful activities;164 and (3) deny full compensation to
157. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1990) (limit on recovery for punitive damages); DEL.
CODE Ar. tit. 10 § 4013 (Supp. 1990) (limit on recovery against state); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-926 (1990)
(limit on recovery against state); IND. CODE ANN. § 344-16.5-4 (Bums 1986) (limiting amount recoverable
from state); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a01 (Supp. 1990) (limit on recovery for pain and suffering); MD.
STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 12-104 (1984) (limit on recovery against state); MnN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.51(3)
(West 1986) (limiting noneconomic damages in automobile accident cases); MiN. STAT. ANN. § 549.23
(West 1988) (limiting amount recoverable for loss of consortium); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.045 (Vernon
Supp. 1991) (limit on recovery against parent for tort of minor); Nay. REv. STAT. ANN. § 598A.170 (1989)
(limit on recovery in action brought by attorney general); N.H. Ray. STAT. § 507-B:4 (Supp. 1990) (limit
on recovery against state); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie Supp. 1990) (limit on recovery for punitive
damages); W. VA. CODE § 55-7A-2 (Supp. 1990) (limit on recovery against parent for tort of minor).
158. For a general discussion, see Francis X. Busch, Remittiturs and Additurs in Personal Injury and
Wrongful Death Cases, 12 DEsm sE L.J. 521 (1963); Jack B. Draper, Comment, Remittitur: Or, the Law
of Diminishing Returns, 24 TEN. L. REv. 1155 (1957).
159. For a general discussion, see Franklin H. Nachnan, Posttrial Alchemy: Judgments Notwith-
standing the Verdict, LITIOATION, Spring 1989, at 13; William P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure: Directed Verdicts and Judgments Notwithstanding Verdict, 2 J. LEOAL STruD. 459 (1973).
160. Other devices available to courts in affecting verdicts include default judgment, summary judg-
ment, and directed verdict. For a discussion, see David P. Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and
Summary Judgments, 45 U. Cn. L. Rnv. 72 (1977); Martin B. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine:
A Critical Analysis, 83 YAm L.J. 745 (1974); Paul B. Weiss, Comment, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There
Substance to the Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATI. U. L. REy. 737, 758-761 (1989).
161. See, e.g., Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) (finding statute limiting
liability of state government entity unconstitutional). For a general discussion in this area, see Fleming
James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm. L. R-v. 610 (1955).
162. That is, to punish the wrongdoer, deter unsafe behavior, and compensate the accident victim.
Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis". A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72
CoRmNa L. R .765 (1987); see also George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAmv.
L. Ray. 537 (1972); David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAuI. L. REV. 665
(1985).
163. It has been argued that tort law is inappropriate as a vehicle for punishment. As one commentator
put it, "the punishment rationale seems more compatible with Mosaic law's 'eye for eye' ... approach
than with an 'enlightened' twentieth-century jurisprudence." Smith, supra note 162, at 776.
164. The court in Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (,Vyo. 1988), articulated this concern as follows:
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accident victims. 165  In spite of this rather harsh but obvious as-
sessment of damage cap statutes, tort reformers vigilantly advo-
cated the installation of medical malpractice damage caps in
virtually every state during the 1970's and 1980's. Their efforts
were not in vain. At least twenty-seven state legislatures capitulated
to the reformers' demafid for medical malpractice damage caps by
the end of the 1980's.166
Almost as quickly as state legislatures enacted damage cap sta-
tutes, medical malpractice victims began challenging the consti-
tutionality of such statutes in state courts.167 The legal arguments
varied, but included many of the following state constitutional
challenges: (1) denial of equal protection; 68  (2) special legisla-
tion; 169 (3) denial of trial by jury;170 and (4) denial of open court.17 '
[I]f the medical profession is less accountable than formerly because of the special treatment it
is afforded by [damage caps], then a relaxation of medical standards may occur with the public
as the victim. '[T]o find that the protection and special dispensation given to health delivery
tortfeasors ... is in the best interest of public health is illogical to the point of irrationality.'
Id. at 783 (third alternation in original) (citations omitted).
165. "Certainly the limitation of recovery does not provide adequate compensation to patients with
meritorious claims; on the contrary, it does just the opposite for the most seriously injured claimants."
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D. 1978).
166. See Table 9, supra note 32.
167. The following cases challenged the constitutionality of damage cap statutes: Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985); Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Jones
v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Central
Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585
(Ind. 1980); Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988); Williams v. Kushner,
549 So.2d 294 (La. 1989); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 462 So. 2d 149
(La. 1985); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H.
1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 482 N.E.2d
1358 (Ohio C.P. 1985); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990); Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d
687 (Tex. 1988); Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989); State e rel. Strykowski
v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
168. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (where damage cap statute was found
to violate state constitutional guarantee of equal protection). But see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (where court found damage cap statute did not violate state constitutional guarantee
of equal protection).
169. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976) (court found
damage cap statute to be special legislation that violated state constitution). But see Etheridge v. Medical
Center Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989) (where court found damage cap statute was not special legislation).
170. See, e.g., Kansas Malpractice Victims v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988) (where damage cap
statute was found to violate state constitutional guarantee of trial by jury). But see Johnson v. St. Vincent
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The reception of these arguments by state courts was best summed
up by the court in Duren v. Suburban Community Hospital,17 2
where it was said that the "scheme of shifting responsibility for
loss from one of the most affluent segments of society [i.e., phy-
sicians] to those who are most unable to sustain that burden, i.e.,
horribly injured or maimed individuals is not only inconceivable,
but shocking to [the] conscience."' 1
73
Although state courts are split on the question of whether or
not medical malpractice damage cap statutes are constitutional,
174
a slim majority have found damage cap statutes unconstitutional
on state constitutional grounds. 175  Courts finding such statutes
constitutional have done so using a rational basis test, 176 while
Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980) (where damage cap statute was found not to be a violation of
state constitutional guarantee of trial by jury).
171. See, e.g., Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (where damage cap statute found
to be in violation of state constitutional guarantee of open court). But see Sibley v. Board of Supervisors
of Louisiana State University, 462 So.2d 149 (La. 1985) (where damage cap statute was found not to be
in violation of state constitutional guarantee of open court).
172. 482 N.E.2d 1358 (Ohio C.P. 1985).
173. Id. at 1363. Of course, this summation is representative of those courts that found damage cap
statutes unconstitutional. The position of those courts finding damage cap statutes constitutional, was summed
up best by the court in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985), where it was said
that
ilt is well established that a plaintiff has no vested property right in a particular measure of
damages, and that the Legislature possesses broad authority to modify the scope and nature of
such damages .... So long as the [statute] is rationally related to a legitimate state interest,
policy determinations as to the need for, and the desirability of, the enactment are for the
Legislature.
Id. (alterations in original, last alteration added) (quoting American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
Hosp., 683 P.2d 670 (Cal. 1984)).
174. The following courts found damage cap statutes did not violate their respective state constitutions:
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404
N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 462 So.2d 149 (La.
1985); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.
1990); Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie,
261 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1978).
175. The following courts found damage cap statutes violated their respective state constitutions: Smith
v. Department of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, (1977); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (II1.
1976); Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988); Lucas v. United States,
757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Williams v. Kushner, 549 So.2d 294 (La. 1989); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d
825 (N.H. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp.,
482 N.E.2d 1358 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1985).
176. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 679 (Cal. 1985).
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those finding just the opposite have done so using variations of
mid-level analysis .177
V. FREE MARKET ANALYSIS OF DAMAGE CAPS
The focus of this part is to provide an economic analysis of
the effects of a cap on verdict awards in medical malpractice cases.
In order to facilitate the reader's understanding of this part, we
will provide a few words on its outline. First, section A provides
background information for the type of economic environment in
which our analysis will take place. Section B provides an economic
analysis of the effects of group premiums 7 8 in a market without
damage caps. Section C provides an economic analysis of the ef-
fects of experience rated premiums 79 in a market without damage
caps. Section D provides an economic analysis of the effects of
group premiums and experienced rated premiums in a market with
damage caps.
A. The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market
Medical malpractice insurance refers to an insurance arrange-
ment made between a doctor and an insurer. Under such an ar-
rangement, the insured doctor makes a predetermined periodic
payment, i.e., a premium payment, to the insurer in return for
which, in the event of a malpractice verdict award against the
doctor, the insurer will pay the damages. The premium charged
by the insurer can generally be classified into two types: (1) group
premiums under which the premium charged any doctor reflects
the odds of the bad state occurring for an entire group of doctors
177. See, e.g., Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978).
178. For a general discussion of group premiums, see David J. Nye, et al., The Causes of the Medical
Malpractice Cris: An Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEo. L.J. 1495
(1988).
179. For a discussion of experience rated premiums, Lori L. Darling, Note, The Applicability of
Experience Rating to Medical Malpractice Insurance, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 224 (1987); Blane F. Nye
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specialized by their specific field of practice and location;8 0 and
(2) experience rated premiums under which the premium any in-
dividual doctor pays will reflect that individual's specific odds of
malpractice. Within any type of premium, the actual size of the
premium will vary depending on the frequency with which mal-
practice is committed by the group or individual, as the case may
be, and the average size of awards.
To simplify our analysis, assume that the insurance market is
competitive and thus insurers can freely enter or exit the market
as opportunities dictate.18' For an insurer to stay in the market
and provide insurance, it must receive at least as good a rate of
return from providing this service as it can get from the best al-
ternative project that can be undertaken.8 2 If the rate of return
is higher than in other ventures, more insurers will enter the market
to provide insurance services. This would drive prices, and thus
the rate of return, to lower levels until there is no longer any
incentive for new insurers to enter or for existing insurers to leave
the market. The profits that the insurer can make in such a market
will, therefore, be equivalent to what it can make from the best
alternative project. Economic profits, or accounting profit after
deducting the opportunity cost of the best alternative project fore-
gone, will then be zero. The economic cost to the insurer of pro-
viding the insurance is the amount of money it expects to pay out
for malpractice claims, i.e., the probability of malpractice awards
180. See infra note 186 for elaboration of bad state and its opposite, good state. For a general
discussion of premium rate making, see Emilio C. Venezian, Ratemaking Methods and Profit Cycles in
Property and Liability Insurance, 52 J. RisK & INs. 477 (1985); James S. Ang & Tsong-Yue-Lai,, Insurance
Premium Pricing and Ratemaking in Competitive Insurance and Capital Asset Markets, 54 J. Rism AND
INs. 767 (1987); Nelson Lacey, The Competitiveness of the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry: A Look
at Market Equity Values and Premium Prices, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 501 (1988).
181. For a discussion of the role government regulations have on rate making, see Scott Harrington,
The Impact of Rate Regulation on Prices and Underwriting Results in the Property-Liability Insurance
Industry: A Survey, 51 J. RisK & INs. 577 (1984); Paul L. Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation
in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 4 Ba J. ECON. 375 (1973); John R. Rizzo, The Impact of
Medical Malpractice Insurance Rate Regulation, 56 J. RJsK & INs. 482 (1989).
182. For a discussion of profit issues in this area, see William B. Fairley, Investment Income and
Profit Margins in Property-Liability Insurance: Theory and Empirical Results, 10 Baa J. EcoN. 192 (1979);
Raymond D. Hill, Profit Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance, 10 BELL J. ECON. 172 (1979); Alan
Kraus & Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of Fair Profits for the Property-Liability Insurance Finn,
37 J. FiN. 1015 (1982).
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multiplied by the amount of the award, plus the opportunity cost
of undertaking this particular venture. 83 The insurer's revenue is
the amount of premium it collects per insurance policy multiplied
by the number of insurance policies sold. An insurer in a com-
petitive market can then charge only a level of premium, i.e., a
fair premium, at which the economic cost that it expects to incur,
including the opportunity cost, is equal to the revenue it generates.
Doctors purchase malpractice insurance to protect themselves
from having to pay out large sums of money to malpractice vic-
tims. The probability of malpractice occurring depends on the
quality of the doctor and the level of effort put forth by the doctor
to avoid negligence. For any given premium, the lower the quality
of the doctor and the lower the level of effort generally put forth
by him or her, the greater will be his or her willingness to purchase
insurance. The premium that he or she pays is determined in the
insurance market, either on a group premium basis or on an ex-
perience rated basis.
84
B. Group Premium Paradigm
In a group insurance scheme, the insurers are only able to charge
a premium on the basis of group characteristics and location. Thus,
a neurosurgeon in one locality will pay the same premium as an-
other neurosurgeon in the same locality. 18
5
183. The insurance industry in general operates in an economic cycle, i.e., a pattern of high profits
for a given period, then low returns and a return to high profits again. For a discussion of this cycle, see
Lawrence A. Berger, A Model of the Underwriting Cycle in the Property/Liability Insurance Industry, 55
J. Risic & IN s. 298 (1988); see J. David Cummins & J. Francois Outreville, An International Analysis of
Underwriting Cycles in Property-Liability Insurance, 54 J. RISK & INS. 246 (1987); Leroy F. Simmons &
Mark L. Cross, The Underwriting Cycle and the Risk Manager, 53 J. Rsc & INS. 155 (1986).
184. For a general discussion of the insurance market, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcoN. Rav. 941 (1963); Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham,
The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J. EcoN. 143
(1977); Issac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self Insurance and Self Protection, 80 J. POL.
ECON. 623 (1972); Richard Zeckhauser, Medical Insurance: A Case Study of the Tradeoff between Risk
Spreading and Appropriate Incentives, 2 J. EcoN. ThEoRY 10 (1970).
185. For a general discussion of how medical malpractice is distributed among doctors, see, Emilo
C. Venezian et al., The Distribution of Claims for Professional Malpractice: Some Statistical and Public
Policy Aspects, 56 J. Risic & IN s. 686 (1989).
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PROPOSITION ONE: Group premiums can force high quality doc-
tors out even if they did not bring about any change in the level
of effort undertaken by the doctors.
186
186. Proof of Proposition 1:
Suppose there are two equally likely types of doctors, high quality and low quality, with associated
probabilities of malpractice of p, and p, respectively, with p., < p. With all insurers facing the same
opportunity costs, under perfect competition the "fair" premium charged will be given by the condition
that economic profits are zero. Thus,
Eli = PM - 1/2 (p, + p,)M = 0 (1)
where Eli is the expected profits per insurance contract sold, p, is the premium per dollar of insurance
purchased, M is the amount of insurance coverage sold. This implies that
P* = 1/2 (ph + p) (2)
Since Ph < p, the "fair" premium p,* is smaller than the probability of malpractice for the low quality
doctor but higher than the probability for the high quality doctor.
The doctors are assumed to derive utility from their consumption out of net income (income net of
insurance expenditure and out of pocket malpractice awards paid). Their consumption in the bad state
(when malpractice occurs) is given by Bad = Y - P, M - D + M, where Y is income, p, M is the total
premium paid, D is the size of damage awarded, and M is the amount covered by the insurance policy.
The utility received in the bad state is U(Bad). Similarly, in the good state (when malpractice does not
occur) consumption is given by Good = Y - PM, since the premium has to be paid regardless of whether
there is malpractice or not. The utility received in the good state is thus U(Good). The expected utility
for a doctor of type i = h, 1, is then,
EU = p, U(Bad) + (l-p) U(Good) (3)
This condition defines the expected utility from consumption or income as the weighted average of the
utility in the two states, weighted by the respective probabilities of occurrence:




Equation 4 equates the rate at which the doctor is willing to substitute income or compensationin
the good state for income in the bad state (the marginal rate of substitution) to the rate at which the
insurer will provide insurance. Each dollar of income given up in the good state entails a potential loss
in utility in the good state of (1- p)U,(Good), while if that dollar is transferred to the bad state there is
a potential increase in utility of pU,(Bad). The ratio of these two is the Marginal Rate of Substitution in
consumption from the good to the bad state. Each additional unit of insurance purchased at a premium
of P,* results in a loss in income in the good state of P, and a gain of (I-P,*) in the bad state. This ratio
is the right hand side term in equation 4.
For a high quality doctor the probability of malpractice, ph, is lower than for a low quality doctor
whose probability is p. Thus, Ph < P, and (1-p,) > (l-p,) which implies that the rate at which the high
quality doctor is willing to trade income in the good state for income in the bad state as given by the
marginal rate of substitution is smaller than for the low quality physician. Since under the group premium
scheme, they both face the same premium of P,*, the right hand side is the same for both qualities but
the left hand side is smaller for the high quality doctor. This means that for the high quality doctor the
price that the insurer charges for transferring income from the good to the bad state is too high relative
to what that doctor is willing to pay. The opposite is true for the low quality doctor. Thus, the high
quality doctor will not purchase this insurance because it is too costily and may find it worthwhile to leave
if insurance is an absolute requirement. The low quality doctors, on the other hand, will find it more than
worth their while to purchase as much insurance as they can.
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Under a group premium, the insurer charges the same level of
premium to all the doctors in a group. This premium will be based
on the average number and size of malpractice awards made against
doctors in that group. A high quality doctor who has had few
malpractice incidents will pay a premium that is too high relative
to that doctor's true odds of malpractice, while a low quality doc-
tor who has had many malpractice incidents will be paying a pre-
mium that is based on the average quality of the entire group and
is thus lower than a premium that truly captures his or her odds
of malpractice. As a result, high quality doctors are forced to
subsidize low quality doctors. Such a situation is called adverse
selection1 8 7 which, by making such insurance a bad buy for the
high quality doctors, forces them to leave that group or locality.
PROPOSITION TWO: Group premiums provide incentives for doc-
tors to reduce the level of effort they put into lessening the oc-
currence of malpractice. 188
Under a group premium structure, the premium paid is not
greatly affected by the frequency with which any one doctor in
187. For a general discussion of adverse selection, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons:
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970); Arthur J. Hosios & Michael
Peters, Repeated Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection and Limited Commitment, 104 Q.J. EcoN.
229 (1989); C. Wilson, The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection, 11 BaL J. ECON.
108 (1980); Bruce C. Greenwald, Adverse Selection in the Labour Market, 53 Rv. CoN. STuD. 325 (1986).
188. Proof of Proposition 2:
Suppose now that the probability of malpractice by any doctor is, to an extent, within the control
of the doctor. Through spending time in ensuring proper care they can reduce the probability of malpractice
occurring. Thus, the probability of malpractice p, is a decreasing function of the level of effort, e,, un-
dertaken by doctor i. The cost of each unit of effort is c. Consumption or net income in either state Good
or Bad is now smaller by ce,, which is the total cost of effort. The optimal choice of the level of effort
and insurance is then determined from maximizing
p(e)U(Bad) + (1-p(e))U(Good) (5)
The first order condition for the optimal level of insurance is the same as equation 4, while the choice
of the optimal level of effort is given by the solution to
p'(U(Bad)-U(Good)) = (c+ 1/2 pAM) [pU(Bad) + (1-p) U)(Good)] (6)
The left hand side of this equation is the expected benefit to the doctor from an additional unit of
effort, while the right hand side is the cost (net of any effect on premium) of an additional unit of effort
expended. Due to the group structure of the premium, the reduction in insurance cost P, ' due to any
additional effort for any one doctor, is less than the actual reduction in the probability of malpractice by
doctor i. Thus, the net cost of effort is higher with the group premium. Moreover, this reduction in premium
cost is granted to all members of the group regardless of which member actually put in the effort. Each
member then has no incentive to spend any effort and would rather have someone else put in the effort,
the benefits of which will be shared by all.
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the group commits malpractice because it will have only a small
effect on the average frequency or incidence of malpractice for
the entire group. When putting forth any effort involves some cost
in terms of time or money and the rewards, i.e., reduced prem-
iums, are low, a doctor who does not have to pay for a verdict
award from his or her own pocket will be less inclined to put in
greater effort at the margin. Such an effect of premiums which
does not reflect individual effort on the insured's level of effort
is called moral hazard.
1 89
COROLLARY ONE: By discouraging high quality doctors and pro-
viding few incentives for high levels of effort, group premiums
increase the incidence of malpractice.
From propositions one and two, group premiums discourage
doctors with low incidence of malpractice from staying in that field
or locality on which the group is based, and offer the doctor few
rewards for taking better care or effort to prevent malpractice.
With more negligent doctors in a group and a lower level of care
taken to prevent malpractice, the incidence of malpractice will be
higher.
C. Experience Rated Premium Paradigm
With experience rated premiums, the level of premium charged
any doctor is determined by the performance of that particular
doctor with regard to the incidence of malpractice claimed against
him or her. The following propositions address the effect of ex-
perience rating on doctor behavior.
PROPOSITION THREE: For any given level of effort, experience
rated premiums will force low quality doctors out.190
189. For a general discussion of moral hazard, see Herbert G. Grubel, Risk, Uncertainty and Moral
Hazard, 38 J. RisK & INs. 99 (1971); Bengt Hohnstr6m, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J.
EcoN. 74 (1979); Mark V. Pauly, Comment, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 53
(1963); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979).
190. Proof of Proposition 3:
With experience rated premiums, the insurer is able to charge each doctor i, according to their in-
dividual probabilities, p,. Thus, the "fair" premium is P,* = p,, for i=h, 1.
The optimal choice of doctor i, is again given by equation 4. Substituting for the individual premium,
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Under this scheme, the level of premium paid by high quality
doctors is low to reflect their low probability of malpractice, while
the low quality doctors will pay a high premium to reflect their
high incidence of malpractice. Thus, no adverse selection problem
exists, and the doctors who are of low quality will find it too
expensive to continue in their profession.
PROPOSITION FOUR: Experience rated premiums offer appro-
priate incentives to encourage doctors to expend effort and care
to a level that is higher than under group rated schemes.' 9'
Since a doctor who undertakes a lot of care to prevent mal-
practice is rewarded in the form of lower premiums, the doctor
will find it worthwhile to increase his or her effort to a level at
which the benefits and costs for additional effort are equal. Thus,
there is no moral-hazard problem either.
COROLLARY TWO: Experience rated premiums are more likely
to decrease the incidence of malpractice.
From propositions three and four, experience rated schemes
discourage low quality doctors from practicing medicine and en-
courage doctors to take proper care to prevent malpractice. Both
of these lower the incidence of malpractice.
P* in equation 4, we have
pU,(Bad) p_
(1-p,)U,(Good) (1-p)
which implies that U,(Bad) = U,(Good) or income in the bad and good states are equal. Thus, the amount
of insurance purchased by doctor i, is equal to the size of the damage, D. Since the high quality doctor
faces a premium that corresponds to his or her low probability of malpractice, while the low quality doctor
faces a higher premium, the problem of "adverse selection" no longer arises.
191. Proof of Proposition 4:
With individualized experience rated premiums, the premium paid by doctor i is equal to that doctor's
probability of malpractice. If the probability of malpractice is lowered through effort there is an equivalent
reduction in premium. Therefore, P,' = p,'. The optimal choice of effort is then determined as the solution
to
p,'(J(Bad)-U(Good)) = (c+p,'I)[p, U(Bad)+(l-p)U,(Good)] (8)
Since the net cost of an additional unit of effort is now smaller than under group premiums, the level of
effort is higher. This is true for both high and low quality doctors. There is no longer a "moral hazard"
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D. Damage Cap Paradigm
We will now analyze the effects of a damage cap on the in-
cidence of malpractice under both group and experience rated
schemes.
PROPOSITION FrVE: A cap on the size of malpractice awards can
generally be expected to lower premium costs under both group
and experience rated schemes.1
92
The cap on the size of awards has the effect of lowering the
expected cost to the insurer for providing the insurance service.
In a competitive market, the insurer is forced to charge a fair price
or premium. Unless doctors are totally unresponsive to changes in
the premium, the insurer. will have to offer insurance at lower
premiums. The extent to which the premium is reduced will depend
on the responsiveness or elasticities of both the insurer's supply
of insurance services and the demand for it.
PROPOSITION sIx: For any given level of effort, a cap on the
size of awards may encourage more low quality doctors to enter
the field.
The proof for this follows from propositions one and three.
Under both group and experience rated schemes, lower premiums,
attributed to the cap, reduce the cost to the low quality doctor of
practicing his or her trade and the size of adverse malpractice
awards. This attracts more low quality doctors into the profession.
The high quality doctors are not likely to be as responsive because
their demand for insurance against a low occurrence event is less
responsive to the premium costs. This is due to their low prob-
ability of malpractice.
192. Proof of Proposition 5:
The "fair" premium that an insurer can charge is given as the solution to
P,M - p,M = 0 (9)
where M is the amount of insurance coverage. If there is a reduction in the amount insurers have to pay
out, D, the expected cost to the insurer is smaller. The new "fair" premium is then determined from
P,M - pD = 0 (10)
which can be solved as
P,* = p, D/M (11)
The smaller D is, the smaller the premium is, P,*.
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PROPOSITION SEVEN: A cap on the size of awards is likely to
reduce the level of effort and care taken to prevent the incidence
of malpractice.
The proof follows from propositions two and four. Lower
premiums, due to the cap, increase the number of doctors who
purchase insurance. This includes those who had previously been
self insured. 193 Self insured doctors are likely to take more pre-
cautions in preventing malpractice since they have to pay out of
their own pockets. With the purchase of group insurance, there
is less return for taking proper care.
COROLLARY THREE: A cap on the size of awards is likely to
increase the incidence of malpractice.
This follows from propositions six and seven. Since there is
likely to be a higher percentage of low quality doctors after the
cap than before, and since the larger demand for the insurance
provided by the insurer reduces the level of care taken to prevent
malpractice, the cap may actually increase the incidence of mal-
practice.
SUMMATION
Medical malpractice damage caps increase the probability of a
patient suffering negligent injury or death by a treating doctor.
This is the unfortunate consequence of attempting to control the
cost of malpractice insurance through damage caps. The threat of
a large verdict award, whether real or illusory, serves a necessary
disciplinary function in the medical profession. Lives have been
saved and permanent injuries averted because of the pressure placed
on doctors by the threat of large verdict awards. Removing this
threat is tantamount to intentionally killing or permanently in-
juring untold numbers of American citizens. No government can
legitimately turn against its people in this manner. The heritage
of our nation speaks better of our lawmakers than this. Our her-
193. For a general discussion of self-insured, see, Patrick L. Brockett et al., Self-Insurance and the
Probability of Financial Regret, 51 J. RisK & INs. 720 (1984).
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itage cries out for more responsible and sober action than what
has befallen and threatens to befall us.
If we are to help competent doctors, and we must, get out
from under the financial burden of excessively high malpractice
insurance, we should do so not at the expense of innocent patients,
but through a process that assures us that only incompetent doc-
tors pay the high cost of their incompetency. The insurance in-
dustry must be guided to the realization that experience rated
premiums provide the most equitable method for insuring doctors.
If lawmakers fail to bring this point to fruition, innocent people
will die or be permanently disfigured by that small percentage of
doctors who are not qualified to be in the medical profession.
VI. CAN WE AFFORD To LIvE WITH INEFFICIENT DOCTORS?
The term "inefficient" is a conceptual device that masks more
than it reveals. 194 To say that a law student is inefficient in his or
her studies or that an automobile manufacturer is inefficient in
the production of cars conveys very little information. To under-
stand the dynamics embedded in the term "inefficient," we must
locate the substantive consequences that can follow from ineffi-
cient study habits or automobile production. 195 Of course, our con-
cern here is not with study habits or automobile production, though
both are worthy of analysis. Our interest at this time is to briefly
explore some of the substantive consequences of having inefficient
doctors in the medical profession. 96
194. For the purpose of this section the term "inefficient" is confined to the context of doctors who
cause injury to patients through negligence.
195. For example, inefficient study habits by a law student could lead to poor grades and eventual
academic dismissal from law school. Academic expulsion could lead to suicide by a distraught law student
or cause a law student to resort to violence against law school faculty. On the other hand, if a law student
with inefficient study habits was allowed to graduate and somehow managed to pass a bar exam, legal
malpractice could become the only thing this former law student masters. The point of this example is
simply to draw attention to the fact that the term inefficient is a conceptual nicety that has very little real
value until you begin to explore its potential consequences.
196. WVe say substantive consequences in recognition of the fact that there are nonsubstantive con-
sequences flowing from the retention of inefficient doctors. For example, the lost income to efficient doctors
as a result of income going to inefficient doctors. Of course, determining what are substantive and non-
substantive consequences is necessarily a subjective process.
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Grave human tragedies invariably flow from allowing ineffi-
cient doctors to exist in the medical profession. 97 This is illustrated
by the conservative estimate that 200,000 people per year suffer
injury or death due to medical negligence.198 Even more disturbing
is the revelation that as many as 10,000 patients die each year
specifically from negligently administered anesthesia. 99 It has also
been determined that 20% of all hospital patients leave the hospital
with a condition they did not have when they arrived. 200 Adding
197. In a 1990 report released by Public Citizen Health Research Group, a list was compiled of the
names of 6,892 doctors who had been punished by medical boards in 41 states. Punishment was handed
down for such offenses as substandard care, over-prescribing drugs, sexual abuse, alcohol or drug abuse,
and crininal convictions. At the time of the release of the report all of the doctors on the list were still
practicing medicine. The head of Public Citizen, Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe, was quoted as saying, "If your
doctor is among the 6,892 on this list, you ought at least to question the quality of his or her care." Anne
Hazard, States News Service, June 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
The admonition by Dr. Wolfe should not be lightly discounted. As a case on point, take the medical
malpractice history of Dr. Frederick Huffnagle, an orthopedic surgeon. At the time a news story was done
on him, he had settled 5 malpractice claims in Massachusetts and had 4 pending claims in California. One
of his Massachusetts victims, Beatrice Higgins, "could walk.., when she was admitted to Hunt Memorial
Hospital with arthritis. Huffnagle implanted an artificial knee that was the wrong size .... When he
removed it later . .. he fractured a bone and ruptured a tendon. Today Higgins, 73, only leaves the
Danvers Nursing Home in a wheelchair." UPI, June 15, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File.
198. Sidney M. Wolfe, Doctor's Malpractice Plan Ignites New Conflict: Letting Doctors Be Judges
Is a Conflict of Interest, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1988, at Z10, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. In spite
of the alarming number of estimated medical malpractice victims, "new findings indicate that few victims
of malpractice ever file suit, and fewer still are compensated." Jane E. Brody, Personal Health, N.Y.
Tums, Apr. 26, 1990, at 14, available in LEXIS: Nexis Library, Omni File.
199. Sperling, The Dark Side of Medical Care, USA TODAY, May 12, 1988. As a further illustration,
the New York State Department of Health issued a report in which it was determined that in 1988 there
were 8,485 medical malpractice incidents filed in the state. At least 375 deaths and 500 permanent injuries
resulted from the reported malpractice incidents. The report was highlighted with the following examples:
a 35 year-old woman was negligently killed during a gynecological operation involving laser surgery; a 55
year-old patient received third-degree bums on her neck, chest and arm after doctors allowed a laser to
ignite drapes in the operating room; and a 5 year-old girl and a 27 year-old man died as a result of
improper dosages of potassium. Michael O'Malley, Hospital Accidents: Malpractice Incidents on the Rise,
UPI, Oct. 6, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
200. Sperling, supra note 199. The following Table presents the total malpractice claims filed with
the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners for the period 1978-1984. The Table points out that over
80% of the negligent injuries took place in hospitals:
TABLE 17:
CLAIMS FILED, TYPES OF NEGLIGENCE
AND LOCATION OF NEGLIGENCE 1978-1984
Type of # Claims Location of # Claims
Negligence Filed Negligence Filed
Fail to Treat 2,452 Hospital 6,282
[Vol. 94
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to this grave parade of human errors is a report indicating that
35% of surgical deaths and 50% of postoperative complications
are due to medical negligence.2 °
While these figures may seem disturbing or even alarming, they
do not begin to tell the story of the medical horror that inefficient
doctors perpetrate on the American public. 20 2 It is a story without
precedent in the annals of tort litigation;20 3 a story that is clothed
Negligent Surgery 2,203 Office 705
Negligent Treatment 1,649 Emergency Room 243
Fail to Diagnose 546 Outpatient Facility 91
Negligent Diagnosis 226 Not Determined 50
Unnecessary Surgery 177 Nursing Home 19
Not Determined 73 Patient's Home 15
Lacked Consent 65
Fail to Operate 9
Breach of Confidence 5
Medical Malpractice In Texas: Are We Covering Up The Symptoms Instead Of Curing The Disease?,
PUBLIc CTZEN oF TExAs.
201. Lauren Chambliss & Sharon Reier, How Doctors Have Ruined Health Care, F cAtCaL WoRum,
Jan. 9, 1990, at 46. For an example, take the publicized death of photographer Bob East. His death resulted
from an operation he had to remove a cancerous eye.
A formaldehyde-like solution meant to receive and preserve the cancerous eye tissue was mis-
takenly injected into [him]. The toxic fluid traveled quickly to the brain, causing irreversible
damage. Mr. East was declared brain dead. Five days later, Mr. East's wife ... accepted the
inevitable and instructed physicians to remove her husband from life-support machinery. Mr.
East died within minutes.
Jon Nordheimer, One Death, Many Questions in Miami, N.Y. Tms, Mar. 10, 1985, at 22, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
202. An article in the New York Times gave the following account of hospitals in New York City
that were fined for causing negligent injuries to patients: Booth Memorial Medical Center was fined $4000
after a kidney dialysis patient died when the water supply to the dialysis unit was mistakenly connected
to the hospital's air-conditioning system which sent a toxic chemical into the water system of the dialysis
unit; St. Luke's Hospital was fined $5000 after a psychiatric patient who was under suicide watch jumped
to his death while in the hospital's care; Beth Israel Medical Center was fined $5000 for prematurely
discharging an AIDS patient who died five days later; Long Island Medical Canter was fined $16,000 for
failing to diagnose a spinal malignancy which resulted in making a 13 year-old patient a paraplegic; St.
Barnabas Hospital was fined $4000 in the death of a patient that was caused by the injection of the wrong
drug. Ronald Sullivan, Hospital Fined for Toxic Flow Fatal to Patient, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1987, at
B24, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
203. For example, take the tragic case of John Chavez. He was "a 30-year-old man who was left
blind and partly disabled after complications during what was to have been a minor surgery on his ankle."
Sonni Efron, Malpractice Victim Gets $3.8 Million, L.A. Tnss, Dec. 21, 1990, at 6, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File. The case of Bruna DeCeglia was tragically similar to Chavez. She went to a
"medical center in 1983 for radiation therapy after having a brain tumor surgically removed at another
hospital .... The medical center chronically aimed 180 radiation beams a day at the wrong spot. The
angle of the beam was such that they aimed the beam at her optic nerve. About a year after radiation
she went blind. . . ." Alvin E. Bessent & Monte R. Young, $2M Given to 2 Victims of Medical Malpractice,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 14, 1990, at 25, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Medical malpractice was
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in a garment of respectability. It is no great secret that the vast
majority of the American public view doctors as god-like. 20 4 The
high esteem in which doctors are viewed has anesthetized our basic
instinct to rebuke and chastise those who cause harm or fatal in-
jury because of carelessness, if not outright indifference.
The imposition of damage caps is another manifestation - a
potent and nefarious sign - of our divine-like perception of the
medical profession. Not only do damage caps tell the medical pro-
fession that we do not mind if inefficient doctors continue to prac-
tice, 205 the caps also tell victims of malpractice that their suffering 26
is inconsequential compared to the happiness of inefficient doc-
tors. As America moves roughshod into the high-tech complexity
of the future, someone must tug on our nation's ear and ask: "Can
we afford to live with inefficient doctors? ' 20 7 A cursory exami-
also traced to the birth of a brain damaged child named Jill Heary. "The hospital records establish that
the entire medical team simply failed Jill and her parents .... The tragic fact is that this baby had been
perfectly healthy right up to two hours before she was born. Jill is now a profoundly retarded quadriplegic."
$3 Million Malpractice Suit Settled for Infant, PR Newswire, Jan. 9, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
204. In a news article reporting on Illinois' damage cap statute, it was said that "[tihe state's new
medical malpractice law elevates doctors to a special privileged class that is above the gods ... ." Law
Has Put Physicians Above Gods, Cm. TRm., Mar. 28, 1986, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File.
205. The following incident illustrates the temerity of the criminal justice system to the issue of medical
malpractice. "This year [1986] the former top heart surgeon at Bethesda Naval Hospital was convicted of
negligent homicide and involuntary manslaughter after the death of three patients. The surgeon was nearly
blind in one eye. One of the patients was so roughly handled during surgery that his chest could not be
closed after the operation." Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Physician Heal Thyself, U.S. Naws & WoRLD RrpORT,
July 21, 1986, at 68, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. The convictions were later overturned
and the doctor "has been reinstated in the American College of Surgeons. He is relicensed in Texas and
Pennsylvania, and has applied in New York." Charges of Malpractice by Dr. Donal Billing, Radio TV
Reports, (PBS Television Broadcast, Feb. 5, 1989, at 7).
206. "There's no way you can understand what I've been through mentally with this," Patricia Renfro
was quoted as saying at a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee. She was one of several victims
of medical malpractice who testified before the committee in 1986. The mental suffering she spoke of
resulted from having breast tissue surgically removed and replaced with an implant. The surgery took place
because her doctor diagnosed her as a high-risk patient for cancer. "However, upon seeking a second
opinion, she found she was actually a low-risk cancer patient who underwent a needless operation." Because
of her doctor's negligence, she had to have five operations and was expected to undergo many more. It
was reported that her doctor was facing "malpractice lawsuits by more than 20 women on whom he
performed mastectomies." Gary E. Duda, Victims Tell Committee of Malpractice Experience, UPI, Feb.
10, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
207. Subsidizing inefficient doctors through damage cap statutes is not the same as providing a tax
break incentive so that inefficient steel manufacturers may stay in business. The ultimate penalty society
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nation of the evidence compiled to date leaves little doubt as to
the answer.
For example, a five-year study was undertaken by researchers
who analyzed 5,000 medical records of hospital patients around
the country. The study was done to determine the appropriateness
of doctors performing three medical procedures; carotid endar-
terectomy, coronary angiography, and intestinal endoscopy. The
researchers found that 17.0% of the coronary angiographs and
intestinal endoscopies were unnecessarily performed, while a full
two-thirds of the carotid endarterectomies were performed un-
necessarily. More alarming than this was the discovery that 10.0%
of the patients who underwent carotid endarterectomies died or
suffered a stroke as a direct result of the procedure. 20 8 The findings
from this study prompted one of the researchers to state pro-
foundly, "If you're 50 and have to look forward to another op-
eration at 58, you may want to think twice. '20 9
pays in extending the practice of inefficient doctors is death. It is as simple and horrifying as that. Inefficient
doctors are licensed killers. In a study conducted by two physicians, 377 medical records of patients in 12
hospitals were analyzed. The study found that 182 patients died while hospitalized and from that number
49 deaths were preventable. Robert W. & Robhert H. Brook, Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often and
Why, 109 ANNAt.s oF IrRNAL MEDIicwE 582, 585 (1988). The following Table reveals the conditions that
the 49 preventable death patients were being treated for and the negligence that led to their deaths:
TABLE 18.
FREQUENCY AND CAUSE OF PREVENTABLE DEATH
Mycocardial Pneumonia Cerebro-Vascular
Cause Infarction % % Acc. %
Inadequate treatment of angina 41 --
Inadequate fluid management 16 20 10
Inadequate control of arrhythmias 10 - -
Inadequate hemodynamic monitoring 9 - -
Improper antibiotics - 30 -
Inadequate oxygen management - 22 -
Inadequate diagnostic work-up 1 13 45
Inadequate treatment of cerebral edema - - 16
Inadequate management of sepsis 5 - 14
Other 18 15 15
TOTAL 100 100 100
Mycocardial infarction deaths = 23
Pneumonia deaths = 17
Cerebrovascular Accident deaths = 9
Id.
208. Doctor Is This Operation Necessary?, 12 RAND RnsnsRca Ram w I (Fall 1988).
209. Id. at 3. To underscore the seriousness of thinking twice before having surgery, we add the
story of an open-heart surgery that was performed on the wrong patient. At the time this story was reported,
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In what has been called the most comprehensive medical mal-
practice study to date, a group of Harvard researchers analyzed
the medical records of over 30,000 patients admitted to New York
hospitals in 1984. The results of this study enabled the researchers
to make the following estimates: (1) out of 2.7 million patients
entering New York hospitals in 1984, 27,000 were victims of med-
ical malpractice; and (2) nearly 7,000 deaths were caused by med-
ical malpractice. 210 The results of the Harvard study prompted one
commentator to say: "It is a horrifying thought to think that one
out of every 100 people who goes into a hospital will be hurt by
their physician. More physicians must be disciplined. More phy-
sicians must be checked for ability to do their job . . . . If they
do not or cannot do their job, they should lose the right to prac-
tice." 211
Implicit in the commentator's words is the knowledge that the
medical profession does not adequately police itself.2 2 As is too
often the case in many -professions, self-regulation is a license for
no regulation. 213 State medical boards have repeatedly failed the
disciplinary action was "still pending against Dr. Daniel Knauf... who operated on the healthy [patient]
in 1988, for letting an assistant, who was not a doctor, examine the patient before surgery instead of doing
it himself." Doctor Operates on Wrong Woman, Cm. TRIB., August 5, 1990, at 3, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File.
210. Richard A. Knox, Study Cites Malpractice System's Toll, BosroN GLOBE, Mar. 1, 1990, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
211. Daniel Kramer, The Harvard Study: An Analysis, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 1990, at 1, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
212. Every state has a medical board, usually fully staffed by doctors, that issues licenses to individuals
to practice medicine. "Generally, licensure boards discipline physicians for conduct described as harmful
to public health or involving moral turpitude .... Despite what appears to be broad authority to act
under state law ... licensure boards generally take few disciplinary actions." Kathleen L. Blaner, Physician
Heal Thysetf: Because the Cure, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May Be Worse Than the
Disease, 37 CAn. U. L. Rnv. 1073, 1079 (1988).
As an example, a study done by the Illinois Coalition for Consumer Rights revealed that the medical
licensing board of Illinois disciplined only 24 doctors from the period covering 1974 to 1986. The cause
for alarm here is brought out by the fact that "[during 1984 and 1985, the state's Medical Disciplinary
Board reported more than 800 medical malpractice settlements in Illinois, including 168 settlements of more
than $100,000 .... Study: Bad Doctors Go Unpunished, U.P.I., Feb. 3, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
213. Take the case of Dr. Milos Klvana, who was convicted of second-degree murder in the deaths
of eight newborns and a fetus. In sentencing the doctor to 53 years in prison, Los Angeles Superior Court
Judge Judith C. Chirlin stated that the Medical Board of California must "accept responsibility for at
least some of the deaths," because of its repeated failures to investigate the doctor properly and stop him
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medical profession and the American public. 21 4 This uncomforting
realization becomes even more pernicious in light of damage cap
statutes. With hardcore evidence clearly demonstrating that state
medical boards will not "get tough" with their members, 215 it be-
from practicing medicine. Virginia Ellis & Robert Steinbrook, Medical Board Lagging in Disciplinary Action;
Doctors: A Judge's Rebuke of State Agency's Role in Klvana Case Underscores Criticism From Other
Sectors, L.A. Tums, May 13, 1990, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
214. "At the New York City hearings on medical malpractice [in 1986], the editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine testified that out of an estimated 20,000-30,000 unfit doctors practicing medicine in
the United States in 1984, only 721 had experienced serious disciplinary consequences .... " Zuckerman,
Physician Heal Thysetfi, supra note 205. The article went on to say that "President Reagan's Secretary
of Health and Human Services, Dr. Otis Bowen, stated ... that nowhere near enough doctors were being
disciplined by review boards. [Dr. Bowen] said that 5 to 15 percent of practicing physicians should be
disciplined, many of them for drug or alcohol-related problems." Id.
For example, take the case of Joyce Palso. Before having cosmetic surgery done to her abdomen,
she contacted the California Medical Board to check the credentials of Dr. James Dean, the doctor who
was going to operate on her. She was told that the medical board had "nothing on him." However, in
truth, "[w]hat the staff of the state medical board did not tell her was that 11 malpractice suits had been
filed against James E. Dean .... " A week after her operation she developed complications, which Dr.
Dean described as normal after-effects of surgery. The truth of the matter was that she "was suffering
from a life-threatening post-surgical infection of a heart valve that would require six hospitalizations and
open heart surgery to correct .... In January 1987, the board revoked Dean's license ... a conclusion
the board said was based on an investigation of [Joyce] Palso's case and several others, including one that
resulted in a patient's death." Sarah Glazer, How Much Do You Know About Your Doctor?, NVAs.
PosT, Mar. 5, 1991, at Z10, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
215. The following Table presents data showing the number of doctors having serious disciplinary
action taken against them for the period 1985-1987:
TABLE 19:
SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST DOCTORS BY
STATE LICENSING BOARDS 1985-87*
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comes frightening to think of what lies ahead in the annals of
medical negligence216 now that tort laws are being written in such
a way that medical negligence is no longer being adequately policed
in civil courts. The American public is likely to pay, for a long
time to come, a tremendous premium unless law makers realize
we cannot afford to live with inefficient doctors.1 7
VII. EPILOGUE
As our nation moves into the 1990's, we must do so with some
degree of guarded caution. The world stage is rapidly changing its
Maine 4 6 3 2,306
Maryland 12 11 26 15,000
Massachusetts 22 42 69 19,766
Michigan 22 14 34 17,549
Minnesota 19 30 28 9,535
Mississippi 6 8 21 3,416
Missouri 39 38 49 9,996
Montana 0 2 1 1,323
Nebraska 0 4 4 2,762
Nevada 16 4 9 1,676
New Hampshire 1 1 4 2,149
New Jersey 76 49 59 18,883
New Mexico 2 4 4 2,735
New York 60 167 259 57,779
North Carolina 17 26 23 11,783
North Dakota 4 2 4 1,136
Ohio 39 58 39 21,744
Oklahoma 23 21 26 4,994
Oregon 25 28 23 5,877
Pennsylvania 57 27 28 28,476
Rhode Island 9 3 4 2,489
South Carolina 17 16 19 5,522
South Dakota 1 1 6 1,004
Tennessee 14 10 8 9,285
Texas 44 41 43 29,207
Utah 19 17 13 3,128
Vermont 1 1 3 1,469
Virginia 42 39 29 12,311
Washington 19 11 23 10,079
West Virginia 7 19 29 3,281
Wisconsin 9 26 45 9,234
Wyoming I 0 1 706
* Disciplinary action includes revocation of license, suspension, and probation.
Pulauc Crr=N (1989).
216. Compounding the problems damage cap statutes cause to the health of society is the equally
menacing fact that even if an inefficient doctor is banned from practicing medicine in one state, the public
in another state is not safe from his or her incompetence. "At present, a doctor may get into trouble in
one state and set up shop in another with little danger his [or her] poor record will follow him [or her] ....
The new doctor in town may have a blacklist 50 pages long, but there will be no way for his [or her]
patients to find out." Lauren Chambliss & Sharon Reier, How Doctors Have Ruined Health Care, Fl-
NAICiAL WoRmD, Jan. 9, 1990, at 49.
217. In a comment on our health care system, former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop wrote, "We
have a system that is distinguished by a virtual absence of self-regulation on the part of those who provide
care - hospitals and health care workers, primarily physicians - but distinguished as well by the absence
of such natural marketplace controls as competition in regard to price, quality or service." Id. at 48.
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scenery and new actors are bidding for starring roles in the coming
production that will unfold in the year 2000. America, no doubt,
will have an opportunity to be a dominant player when the dust
settles and the world curtain rolls up. There is a crucial question,
however, which we must confront now, before the curtain rises:
Will America play a dominant role throughout the millennium that
is swiftly approaching, or will we lose our opportunity to play a
dominant role shortly after the millennium begins due to self-de-
struction? Whether we realize it or not, the longevity of our na-
tion's preeminence will be determined in the decade that is upon
us. History waits for no nation and, in a Darwinian sense, it takes
no prisoners. History will banish us to obscurity, just as it has
banished past great nations, if we incorrectly resolve the critical
issues that test us at this very hour.
This Article has not attempted to address all the critical issues
confronting our nation at this time. Our concern has been limited
to but one of these issues - unyielding health care costs. In wres-
tling with this unbridled beast, we have not attempted to struggle
head-on with it. Such an effort requires far greater space than this
Article will afford us. Instead, we have chosen to hold up a yellow
flag of warning regarding an issue that has been unwisely tied to
the health care cost crisis. Written on this yellow flag of caution
was the following: (1) solving the crisis in costs of medical mal-
practice insurance will not slow the pace of soaring health care
costs; (2) reforming tort laws will not appreciably slow the pace
of medical malpractice insurance costs; and (3) reformation of
medical malpractice tort laws has and will continue to directly
cause preventable deaths and permanent injuries.
The pressing urgency of our flag is inextricably wrapped up in
the proposal the Bush Administration unleashed in its 1992 budget
package.2 18 This proposal seeks to force the nation to walk down
218. The following is the full text of President Bush's proposal:
MEDICAL PROFEssIONAL LIABiTy REFoRMS. - From 1984 to 1988 medical malpractice premiums
rose from approximately $1.9 billion to $4.2 billion. This has led some physicians to alter their
behavior in an effort to avoid liability - often choosing to discontinue high-risk practices or
to engage in unnecessary defensive medicine. Growing liability costs and unnecessary defensive
medicine contribute to high health care costs that are a problem for everyone.
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a path that, heretofore, only a handful of states were committed
to walking. The Administration's medical malpractice tort reform
proposal must be vigorously challenged and ultimately defeated.
There is little room for compromise on this matter. The health
and lives of literally every American rest on this issue. Insulating
the medical profession from the vitality of our tort laws is a form
of deregulation that will not lead to bankruptcies that often follow
deregulation - its consequences are far more serious.
There is no rational relationship between punishing victims of
medical malpractice and lowering the cost of medical malpractice
insurance or health care costs in general. The only relationship
that exists between these issues is a lobbying relationship. The Ad-
ministration's proposal is a mirror image of the tort reform pack-
age the medical profession and insurance industry have peddled
for two decades in state legislative halls across the nation. It does
The Administration's reform package will include proposals that encourage States to:
[1] Cap the amount of allowable non-economic damages. In the 26 States that have limited
total damages, malpractice rates have declined significantly;
[2] Eliminate joint and several liability for noneconomic damages;
[3] Eliminate the collateral source rule that allows for double recovery;
[4] Require structured payments for malpractice awards, as opposed to lump sum payments;
[5] Promote pretrial alternative dispute resolution, including mediation and pretrial screening
panels, to encourage reasonable settlements;
[6] Implement procedures to enhance the quality of care.
Additionally, at the Federal level the Administration will propose to apply these tort reforms
to Federal courts; to begin a pilot program in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program
that offers alternative dispute resolution; and to improve the quality of medical care through
enhanced effectiveness research and improved peer review.
To avoid peempting State laws and to encourage States to adopt liability reforms within
a reasonable three-year time period, the Administration will propose to initiate, beginning in
1995, budget neutral incentive pools in Medicare and Medicaid.
Under the proposal, the Department of Health and Human Services would pool:
[1] A portion of the annual increase (1 percent of total payments) in Medicare prospective
payments for hospitals - approximately $800 million in 1995;
[2] A portion (2 percent) of the State Medicaid match for staff salaries and expenses. State
match rates average 53 percent. This pool would amount to approximately $90 million in 1995.
The proposal does not affect Medicaid provider reimbursement.
States that adopt a requisite number of reforms would share in the pool. Those States
would receive enhanced Medicaid administrative match rates and their hospitals would receive
supplemental payments. This structure provides incentives for the States to quickly adopt reforms
- the States that act first will receive a reward, as will the State's hospitals.
ExEcuTIvE OFFIcE OF nm PREsIDENT OF TE UNrrED STATES, BUDGE OF THE UNrrED STATES GOVERNMENT
FiscAL YEAR 1992, PART Two 278-79 (1991).
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not take a genius to see that the tort reformers have sneaked into
the backdoor of the White House and convinced the Administra-
tion to force the majority of the states to do that which previously
they have resisted as wrong.
At a time when our nation has an estimated thirty million or
so citizens without health care coverage, the Administration's pro-
posal seeks to add to this number by cutting federal dollars to
states that refuse to endanger the lives and health of their citizens
by enacting medical malpractice tort reform measures. The Ad-
ministration's proposal is a threat of death or injury to every
American. The American public must unite and stand up to this
threat, for it is as real as the forces that have convinced the Ad-
ministration to take this course.
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